Pritam Singh -
There appears to be a shift in how the People’s Action Party (PAP) is handling public communication involving the influx of foreigners into Singapore. In his National Day 2010 speech released to the mainstream media on 8 Aug 2010, PM Lee Hsien Loong acknowledged “Singaporeans’ concern” about the government’s hitherto open-door policy towards foreigners. He went on to state:
“We will control the inflow, to ensure that it is not too fast, and not too large. We will only bring in people who can contribute to Singapore, and work harder to integrate them into our society. And we will make clear that citizens come first. After all, we are doing this for the sake of Singaporeans.”
While this belated acknowledgment of the opinion and feedback of Singaporeans over the foreign talent (FT) policy is welcome, the Prime Minister has not gone far enough in communicating to Singaporeans the medium to long-term social impact of the policy, and what measures will be taken to address these impending changes. For the Malay community in particular, the changes may be profound. These challenges are illustrated in three overlapping areas that this article will explore.
The Total Fertility Rate problem and the Malay Community
It is well known that both the Indian and Chinese communities in Singapore are not reproducing at the level required to replace themselves (the population replacement level is statistically set at 2.1, i.e. each couple on average must have at least two children). According to government statistics, the total fertility rate for the Chinese community in Singapore correct as of 2009 stood at 1.08, while the Indian community fared little better at 1.14.
According to Department of Statistics data, the TFR for the Malay community stood at 2.54 in 2000, falling rapidly to 2.07 in 2005 (i.e. below the population replacement figure) and continuing its downward slide in 2007 to 1.94, with 2008 recording a TFR of 1.91 and finally with 2009 revealing a TFR of 1.82. According to a government document released in June 2010 titled “Population in Brief 2010″ collectively produced by five government agencies[1] compared to all the races in Singapore, the TFR for the Malay community “showed the most significant decline over the past decade”.
One of the fundamental prongs of the PAP’s FT policy has been to rely on Chinese and Indian immigrants to make up for the abjectly low birth rates of local Chinese and Indian citizens. A separate prong of that very policy calls for additional Chinese and Indian immigrants, so as to increase Singapore’s population size.
In the first place, opening the floodgates to Chinese and Indian immigrants only when the TFR problem affecting local Chinese and Indians reached a critical point reflects a lack of foresight by the PAP. In fact, the unhappiness among local Indian and Chinese communities over the sudden introduction of large numbers of Indian and Chinese immigrants respectively at the expense of national, social and intra-community unity was raised even in the PAP-dominated parliament well before PM Lee’s 2010 National Day commitment to “control the inflow”.
With the Malay community’s TFR rate dipping below population replacement levels from 2005 and continuing on a steady downward trajectory, the government would do well to immediately initiate a process of inducting Malay immigrants into Singapore so as to “top up” the Malay population to population replacement levels, rather than to wait till the problem reaches critical levels, a mistake the PAP government committed with the Indian and Chinese communities. Such a move to introduce a much more socially manageable number of Malay immigrants will pre-empt and greatly reduce the potential prospect of any social friction that might be felt between resident Singapore Malays and potential Malay immigrants.
With a second prong of the PAP FT policy seeking to encourage greater immigration into Singapore to increase the population size of the country, the critical question for the Malay community pertains to the number of Malay immigrants that have been granted citizenship on this account. In the interests of inter-racial and intra-communal harmony in Singapore, the relevance of this question cannot be understated.
From the demographic percentages, the numbers for the Malay community have dropped from the traditional 15% mark to around or perhaps even less than 13% today (the latest figures were not stated in the aforementioned “Population in Brief 2010″ document). This is not surprising, given the steadily falling TFR rate for the Malay community from a high of 2.69 in 1990. Malay community leaders ought to make enquiries into the sweeping effects of the PAP’s FT policy before the problem of falling numbers creates feelings of insecurity and irreversibly damages Singapore’s social fabric because of the Malay community’s demographic hemorrhage.
The PAP “Malay-Security-Dilemma”
The second tectonic effect of the FT policy on the Malay community finds its roots in a more primordial, pre-independence political worldview – one that has operated below the surface, with little active PAP intervention at invoking a more vocal stance against seeing the world through its eyes – Race.
Three separate illustrations will frame this section. First, from independence, relations between Singapore and Malaysia often turned on the lot of the Malay and Chinese minorities in each country respectively. Traditional historians often cast the racial riots of 1964 in Singapore as the straw that broke the camel’s back resulting in Singapore, through Goh Keng Swee, requesting to leave the Malaysian Federation.
A second bone of contention was Singapore’s water dilemma, with Singapore having to rely on pre-independence colonial treaties signed with the southern-most Malaysian state of Johor to secure its fresh water supply.
Thirdly, in the 1990s, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew questioned the wisdom of having a Singaporean Malay commander put in charge of a machine-gun unit in Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) – a somewhat catch-all metaphor positing why Malays had to be excluded from certain military appointments, and perhaps a convenient explanation of the abject lack of Malays holding top appointments in the SAF and in the meritocracy-based civil service.
Forty-five years after Singapore’s independence, it is argued that the relationship between Malaysia and Singapore has taken a fundamental turn with the Badawi and Najib administrations.
A HongKong-Shenzhen modelled hinterland relationship has been mooted between Singapore and Johor (Malaysia) through Iskandar Malaysia, in addition to talk of passport-less travel and a possible SMRT line extending to Johor from Singapore. Corporate interests, with some linked to government entities on both sides of the causeway have already committed to a slew of investments in Johor. In addition, from March 2010 this year, the PAP government has allowed Singaporeans to use their Medisave savings for treatment in selected Malaysian hospitals not just in Johor, but in the farther state of Malacca as well, a move that is perhaps the most concrete reflection of a new phase of not just cordiality, but inter-connectedness in Singapore-Malaysia relations.
Singapore’s reliance on raw water from Johor, often seen by military strategists worldwide as the harbinger of any military hostility between the two nations, is also steadily decreasing. Singapore has already announced it will allow the 2011 Water Agreement with Malaysia to lapse, a move made possible by Singapore’s diversification strategy via NeWater, desalination and an increased rainwater catchment area.
The perennial PAP Malay-security-dilemma of a Singaporean Malay soldier with family ties in Malaysia who may hesitate to shoot a fellow Malay in Malaysia in times of war, has always sat uneasily with this writer. Although specious, it does not address the prospect of the same dilemma should a Singaporean Chinese with family ties in Malaysia have a Malaysian Chinese in his gunsights, ditto the same quandary for an Indian soldier.
Regardless, any talk of conflict between the two neighbours sounds increasingly remote today largely thanks to the efforts of the business community on both sides of the causeway from the beginning of this decade in particular. With significant Singaporean investments in Malaysia, and with the soon to be operational joint development company, M-S Pte Ltd, incorporated to develop Malaysian railway land in Singapore, both countries have so much economic capital and resources at stake that it makes historical sense to reconsider the traditional bilateral narrative and question the military narrative underlying Singapore-Malaysia relations.
Any such exercise ought to have far-reaching, albeit positive implications for the Malay community in Singapore. The image of the loyalty-divided, machine-gun totting Malay Singaporean is increasingly obsolete precisely because of the ever-increasing amounts of economic capital being invested by Singaporeans in Malaysia and Malaysians in Singapore.
The aforementioned point notwithstanding, the FT policy has ironically put the issue of the PAP Malay-security-dilemma on the front foot. On the grounds of nation-building and national unity, no reality can be more unfair or emotionally jarring than that of a new immigrant of non-Malay heritage, superseding a Singaporean Malay citizen on grounds of “security” in regard to military or civil service appointments.
One of the more positive effects of the FT policy in the mind of this writer is that it has forced all Singaporeans to appreciate the nation-building contradiction inherent in the preceding point. In this age of immigration in Singapore, the race-loyalty dialectic makes even less sense, especially since the cornerstone of any immigration policy must be loyalty to the country, not loyalty to race.
All said, if the PAP casts the question of the impact of the FT policy on the Malay community as a can that can be kicked further down the road for the next generation to resolve, this writer is convinced that the problem will become exponentially more problematic to address, at the expense of our multi-racial compact.
The PAP’s Meritocracy and the Malay Community
Finally, the ideological bulwark to the Singapore success story – meritocracy – is supposedly the ultimate barometer of equality in Singapore. While no one doubts the theoretical principles that underlie meritocracy, its impact in the practical realm for the Malay community has been decidedly mixed at best and only benefitting a minority of Malays at worst, notwithstanding former Singapore Minister for Malay-Muslim affairs, Sidek Saniff’s resolve in a feature in the Straits Times on 4 Jun 2010 (“Taking the tough road pays off”) that:
“Meritocracy has hastened the sense of confidence and equal treatment of Singaporean Malays, who feel they are not being stigmatised and can compete on a level playing field.”
While the aspirational objectives of meritocracy for the average Malay (or indeed a Singaporean of any race) in Singapore were put across rather lucidly by the ex-Minister, the educational performance of the Malay community viz. the other communities and the ground reality leaves a chasm that cannot be solely adequately explained or addressed by a PAP commitment to meritocracy.
In concert with the 25th anniversary of Mendaki (the Malay self-help community organisation that focuses on education in particular), PM Lee asked for a comprehensive report to trace how far the Malay community had come since the formation of Mendaki in 1982. Taken alone, the report shows good progress made by the Malay community, a feat that speaks well of all the Malay community representatives, regardless of political affiliation, who sought to improve the lot of the Malay community from 1982. However, as revealed in the report, the progress of the Malay community remained statistically poorer when contrasted against the progress of the Chinese and Indian communities along the same range of indicators, and in some cases, acutely so.
Separately, in a question put to the Minister of Education in parliament early this year, Mr Zaqy Mohamed, PAP MP for Hong Kah, asked “what more can be done to help Malay students progress at the same rate, if not better, compared to their peers from other race groups?” The Minister’s answer was rather standard-form and broad-brushed, without policy specifics.
“Schools will do their part in helping weaker students improve. But MOE also works in partnership with community groups such as Mendaki, parents support groups and other VWOs to provide extra support for these students. Parents and families, of all races, can support students by ensuring that they attend school regularly, motivating them to work hard, and adopting good habits like reading widely. Community and self-help groups can also help families deal with problem issues related to finances, jobs and relationships, in order to create a more supportive home environment.”
In fairness to the government, the community-self help solution has improved the status quo of the Malay community in some ways. But any message of meritocracy and equal competition automatically puts Malays in an inferior position largely because of their relatively lower income and lack of access to opportunity: meritocracy does not mean everybody begins the race at the starting line. Many of our Malay brothers and sisters have other socio-economic battles to fight before they even get in the race, and even when they do, many face an incline right from the get-go.
In a thoughtful commentary written by Lendra Putera Nurezki, “Academic dilemma of the Malay Community Revisited” for the Singapore-based Centre for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs (RIMA), the latter observed that “little progress” had been made in regard to the academic performance of Malay students over the last 10 years. He suggested that the problem of education and the Muslim community ought to be elevated to the “national level” so as to “spur a consolidated effort…and generate productive solutions”.
It is clear that fresh ideas are required to assist the Malay community – ideas that do not diminish their self-respect or which suggest that Malays require a crutch to succeed in Singapore.
One possible solution in the education realm posits the creation of a national endeavour that seeks to buttress the goals of meritocracy against rising inequalities in Singapore. This solution portends the creation of an independent government-funded body that operates alongside self-help groups but which transcends race. Depending on its focus, such a body can look at issues in regard to poverty, education etc. from a national perspective, and separately, source its funding (up to10%, or a similar GDP percentage the state spends of education) from the profits accrued from successful divestments made by Temasek Holdings and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation. In the case of education for example, it can offer classes or specialized education programs at little-cost only to students who constantly do poorly in schools, complete with specially-teachers trained to assist such students who very often come from poorer backgrounds. And because it would be a non-race based national program, over-representation of Malays or any other race for example would be purely coincidental, particularly since the objective of that very program would be a more egalitarian and inclusive society.
In a M.A. thesis submitted to the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore in 2006, one Hafsah binte Mohammad Kassim, contended that tuition classes alone did not represent the elixir that will solve the problem of the relatively poorer performance of Malay students in school. Significantly, she also raised the issue of “educationalism” within the Malay community, and posited that it was time for Malay/Muslim leaders “to look beyond education in formulating reforms amongst the Malay/Muslim community”. In addition, Hafsah queried the unexplored correlation between improved performance in school and improved occupational prospects for Malays contending that it was “naïve to believe that all problems and challenges facing the community would inexplicably vanish with the panacea of education.” Any national effort along the lines prescribed in the preceding paragraph would do well to consider Hafsah’s caveat and look to propose holistic, not piece-meal policy solutions.
Hafsah’s contention represents a good place to end this article that sought to define the principal issues that ought to be at the top of the minds of the Malay community in Singapore today. The long-standing question of Malay loyalty and commitment to Singapore has often found substance in the PAP Malay-security-dilemma as highlighted earlier by this writer. However, in a recent poll done carried out by the Institute of Policy Studies of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, many Singaporeans I spoke to were surprised to note that Malays topped all the ethnic groups (Chinese, Malays, Indians, Others) in their “Willingness to Sacrifice” for Singapore.
With the impact of FT policy and the increasingly less contentious relationship with Malaysia upon us, Singapore’s Malays find themselves at a critical junction – one that ought to be seized upon by the government of the day to better integrate the Malay community within the Singapore social compact. The product of any such policy will compensate for the increasing inequalities prevalent in Singapore society, strengthen the function of meritocracy as national ideology and give real meaning to a more inclusive Singapore.
Pritam Singh is the founder of OpinionAsia (www.opinionasia.com <http://www.opinionasia.com> ). He is currently a Juris Doctor candidate at the Singapore Management University and a member of the Workers’ Party. The views expressed here are his own.
He also blogs at singapore2025.wordpress.com
Pritam would like to request Malay Singaporeans in particular to give him feedback and/or criticism on this article. Please pass this article on to your Malay friends and relatives too for the same purpose. Pritam’s email address is singhpritam@gmail.com <http://singhpritam@gmail.com> . Thank you and Selamat Ramadhan.
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Useful Links and Resources
1. Population in Brief 2010 – www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/people/popinbrief2010.pdf <http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes/people/popinbrief2010.pdf>
2. Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at MENDAKI’s 25th Anniversary Dinner and Awards Presentation, Orchid Country Club, Sunday 2 Sep 2007 – http://www.mendaki.org.sg/content_files/pmLeespeech.htm
3. Progress of the Malay Community since 1980 -http://newarrivals.nlb.gov.sg/itemdetail.aspx?bid=12920608Available at: http://app1.mcys.gov.sg/ResearchRoom/ResearchStatistics.aspx?yr=2005
4. Hafsah binte Mohammad Kassim, M.A.Thesis, Singapore Malays’ attitude towards education: A look at the impediments to educational development – Available at Scholarbank@NUS- https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/12980 -
5. Parliamentary Question by Zaqy Mohamed on educational progress of the Malays – http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/parliamentary-replies/2010/02/exam-performance.php
6. Institute of Policy Studies: LKY School of Public Policy Survey (NUS) Survey – Citizens and the Nation: National Orientations of Singaporeans Survey (NOS4) – http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/nos_4_2010.aspx
[1] National Population Secretariat, Singapore Department of Statistics, Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, Ministry of Home Affairs and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority
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Headline picture from Family & Community @eCitizen.
Racial controversies
Malays were virtually excluded from conscription from the beginning of the draft in 1967 until 1977[2] and, after the policy was eased, were assigned mainly to serve in the police and civil defence (fire brigade), not active combat roles[2]. In 1987, Lee Hsien Loong (then Second Minister for Defence) stated that “If there is a conflict, if the SAF is called to defend the homeland, we do not want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his emotions for the nation may be in conflict with his religion”[3] and in The Roar of the Lion City (2007), military analyst Sean Walsh claimed that “official discrimination against the Malay population remains an open secret”[4]. The Ministry of Defence contests the charge, noting that there are “Malay pilots, commandos and air defence personnel” and stating that “the proportion of eligible Malays selected for specialist and officer training is similar to the proportion for eligible non-Malays.”[5]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conscription_in_Singapore
If Singapore is attacked by India and China, Who will Singapore send to fight.
Japan,Portugal, Spain, Netherland,British had colonised our land before.Are they our neighbours?
Malays were “VIRTUALLY” excluded from conscription from the beginning of the draft in 1967 until 1977.
They’re have no guts to tell the truth.
Hey iamLastsurvivor…
And thanks for pointing out my typing error; it was really 1964, not “1965”.
BTW, what was your ranting and raving about?
The only outstanding matter I read was the similarities between “Kota Tinggi” in 1964 and your present day anecdote in Mandai. Are you saying that the SAF are badly led that your recruit-comrades don’t obey orders and lacked diligence in vigilance much like ‘back in 1964’. Please direct your complaints to the Mindef or SAF general staff and see that these “howlian attitudes” soldiers are punished to your happiness and satisfaction.
Brown People 1 September 2010
“For some 600 years, Jawi script has been the Malay language alphabets making it synonymous with the Malay language, Bahasa Melayu. The Jawi script differentiates Bahasa Melayu from Bahasa Malaysia, as a language belonging to the Malays. Bahasa Malaysia is the language belonging to Malaysians who may be Malay, Chinese, Indian and other tribes.”
600 years? The ancient civilisations of India and China are more than 5 000 years!
Furthermore, Jawi or renkong originates from the Middle East – Arabia, Turkey . . .
Bahasa Malaysia or Melayu is christian romanised script adopted by the Indonesians in the late 20th century.
The oldest(youngest) written Sejarah Melayu is written in Jawi. Its span is limited either laterlly or horizontally unlike Bahasa which can rubbish the spelling of the English language – tain (tren), confrontation (konfrontasi), etc.
ok tartau..tidak tau whatever.. i am gonna give you some face whatever left of YOU…
here is a geniued true story of a real malay regiment hero who fought and die for singapore..so please don’t tell me
mindef/saf never taught me the art of war
as mentioned before..i DO give credits whoever/whatever RACEs that are dued..
………………
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Pasir_Panjang
The 1st Malaya Infantry Brigade, comprising the British 2nd Loyal Regiment under Lt Col Mordaunt Elrington, the 1st Malaya Regiment commanded by Lt Col J.R.G. Andre, consisting of less than 3 sections of the Mortar Platoon, Anti-Aircraft Platoon with the Bren Gun Carrier Platoon under Captain R.R.C. Carter held in reserve. They were tasked with defending the approach to Pasir Panjang ridge, known as The Gap. The 44th Indian Brigade were on their right flank.
A Malay platoon, consisting of 42 men, commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Adnan bin Saidi, was holding part of the defenses of Bukit Chandu. He and his men would take the brunt of the Japanese assault.
[edit] Battle
The first battle between the Malay Regiment and Japanese soldiers occurred on 13 February at around 1400 hours. The Japanese 18th Division started to attack the South-Western coast along the Pasir Panjang ridge and astride Ayer Raja Road. The Japanese 56th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Yoshio Nasu, supported by a considerable force of artillery, attacked the ridge during the morning.
One of the units defending the line was B Company of the Malay Regiment. Under heavy fire from the Japanese troops supported by artillery and tanks, B Company was forced to retreat to the rear. But before this could be completed, the Japanese army succeeded in breaking through B Company’s position. In the battle, the troops fought hand-to-hand combat using bayonets against the Japanese. A few from B Company managed to save themselves while others were caught as prisoners-of-war. This penetration led to the withdrawal after dark of both 44th Indian and 1st Malay Brigade to the general line Mount Echo (junction of Raja and Depot Road) Buona Vista.
[edit] Bukit Chandu
Malay mortar crew displayed at Bukit ChanduOn 14 February, the Japanese again launched a heavy attack at 0830 hours, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire, on the front held by the 1st Malay Brigade. The defenders beat off this and a number of other attacks. The fighting included bitter hand-to-hand combat, and losses from both sides were heavy. At 1600 hours an attack supported by tanks eventually succeeded in penetrating the left, and the defenders on this flank were forced back to a line from the junction of the Ayer Rajah and Depot Road through the Brick Works and along the canal to Bukit Chermin. Owing to the failure of units on both its flanks to hold their ground, the 1st Malay brigade withdrew at 1430 hours. It was at this point that C Company of the Malay Regiment received instructions to move to a new defence position, Opium Hill.
Opium Hill or Bukit Chandu in Malay was named after an opium-processing factory located at the foot of the hill. This was also where C Company of the Malay Regiment made their final stand against the Japanese attack. Opium Hill was a key defence position for two important reasons. It was situated on high ground overlooking the island to the north; and secondly, if the Japanese gained control of the ridge, it gave them direct passage to the Alexandra area. The British army had its main ammunition and supply depots, military hospital and other key installations located in the Alexandra area.
C Company’s position was separated from D Company by a big canal. Oil was burning in the canal, which flowed from Normanton Depot. The burning oil prevented C Company soldiers from retreating further south. The company was under the command of Captain H.R. Rix, a British officer. He encouraged the men to defend Opium Hill down to the last soldier, and was killed together with many of his Malay Regiment soldiers in the last defensive battle at Pasir Panjang.
The Japanese pressed their attack on Opium Hill in the afternoon, but under the guise of a deception. They sent a group of soldiers, dressed in Punjabi uniforms, passing themselves off as Indian soldiers in the British army. C Company saw through this trick as they knew that soldiers of the British army usually marched in a line of three whereas the disguised soldiers were in a line of four. When they reached the Malay Regiment’s defensive line, C Company’s squad opened fire, killing several men. Those who survived escaped downhill.
[edit] Last Stand
Two hours later, the Japanese launched an all-out banzai attack in great numbers. The attack overwhelmed the Allies, and the defence line shattered. Greatly outnumbered and short of ammunition and supplies, they continued to resist the Japanese. All kinds of arms such as grenades, small arms and bayonets were used by the troops. Soldiers engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat using bayonets. Yet, they stood their ground, frustrating the Japanese. Adnan was seriously wounded but refused to retreat or surrender and instead encouraged his men to fight to the end.
Soon after, Pasir Panjang was under Japanese control, and Adnan bin Saidi, wounded and unable to fight, was captured. Instead of taking him prisoner, he was continuously kicked, punched and beaten by the Japanese. He was then tied to a cherry tree and bayoneted to death.
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Pritam wrote: “the numbers for the Malay community have dropped from the traditional 15% mark to around or perhaps even less than 13% today (the latest figures were not stated in the aforementioned “Population in Brief 2010″ document).”
It is on the Stats Dept website. As at end June 2010, Malays constituted 503,000 out of resident population of 3.772 million, thus 13.4 percent. Resident population means citizens + permanent residents.
no brainer,
not contributing to this name calling rhetoric which is seemingly racist.
oh well what do you expect? Singaporeans…
nonidiot 4 September 2010
no brainer,
not contributing to this name calling rhetoric which is seemingly racist.
oh well what do you expect? Singaporeans…
….
hello gurkhas grandson…how are you today? your injured warhero scar uncle is a gurkha? the 3rd regiment of the royal malaysian ranger is not that elite afterall..you still 1st me to repost(toc moderated) how the company was WIPED OUT SLEEPIN ON DUTY in sabah? it was the GURKHAs that kicked the indonesian elite paratroopers..not the 3rd rgiment of the royal malaysian rangers..so please don’t used other people karchngs to stick on YOUR fACe… lu TIDAK bolehed…balek kampong tidur lark…
From a Malay’s perspective, we are not trusted as a responsible citizen by a government who constantly extorted us to be loyal. So is it worth extending any loyalty at all?
To all my Malay brothers out there, who sign on as an army regular (if there is any) for whatever reason there is, be it for the love of our country or due to a lifelong ambition, you deserve my utmost respect.
Singapore has always lived up to its name. Its survival always rest on it being able to get as many people it can to run its economy. When viewed historically, foreign talent is really nothing new to Singapore. It should not matter whether they are Chinese, Indian, Malays or whatever. As a Malay and a minority, I have reconciled with the fact that my role in Singapore is fairly limited. And therefore I have chosen to live outside Singapore. There is no anger. There should not be. For me, Singapore is relevant so long as it is economically relevant. Economics, above every thing else, form the bedrock of Singapore survival. Raffles wanted to set up a factory in an uninhabited island and Singapore has lived up to that expectation ever since. We have to rid ourselves of issues of race and demography and view Singapore as just an emporium to make a living. And if we find it all unbearable we all have the option of making a better life elsewhere.
In my view no malay ethnic background, either from Malaysia, Indonesia or Brunei would want to be a Spore citizen. Its either cause of work,leisure or business that they are there. Singapore is a unique place, where competition is everywhere….start from school, working and life style. A person is measure by its career, place they live and car they drive…..if you’re slow, you’ll left behind in life.
Because of the denial of Malays from the National Service in 1967 until 1977, most of them could not find jobs. Jobs not only required proof of having served in the National service but also, for Singapore Malays and others. required to know Mandarin.
Inability to get jobs made a sizeable number of Malays then sought relief in drugs, and made them drug addicts to this day. And all know what happened in Singapore if one became a drug addict.
Mansal, maybe you can join NSP Malay Bureau and ask them to organise a protest for chinese language requirement and other issues?
Andrew leung
You right, hope more to joint NSP and how?.
Dear We Can,
There is an event on 16 December 2010, perhaps you can direct the question to the various party leaders on their stance on Malay/Muslim matters or other concerns.
I think the opposition party has to capitalize on every Singaporean voter including the minority votes. Let’s see if they can best represent their interests.
http://theonlinecitizen.com/2010/12/toc-presents-the-political-event-of-the-year/
No matter how many Malay Bureau u put in any political party there will be still distrust against the Malay Muslim Community in Singapore.. From my point of view, all of you are manipulating the Malay Muslim Community.