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Minister of Home Affairs’ vagueness on determining foreign interference risk

Opinion: Singapore’s Minister for Home Affairs blocks 95 accounts under FICA, citing threats from Guo Wengui. However, transparency is lacking, as Guo is imprisoned. Why isn’t POFMA used to counter falsehoods?

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The recent directive from Singapore’s Minister for Home Affairs under the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) to block 95 social media accounts linked to former Chinese real estate mogul Guo Wengui raises several critical questions about the transparency and criteria used to assess the threat of foreign interference.

While the press release from the Ministry of Home Affairs outlines the actions taken and the affiliations of the accounts, it remains ambiguous about the specific methodologies and evidence that led the Minister to determine that these accounts pose a significant risk to Singapore’s sovereignty. The statement broadly claims that the accounts are linked to Guo and his organisations, the New Federal State of China and the Himalaya Supervisory Organisation. However, it does not elaborate on the concrete steps or the investigative process used to establish these links.

Connection to Hostile Information Campaigns

The Minister asserts that these accounts were part of a network publishing coordinated posts about Singapore’s leadership transition, suggesting deliberate planning and hostile intent. However, the criteria for determining the accounts’ involvement in a hostile information campaign (HIC) remain unclear. How does the Minister differentiate between genuine public discourse and coordinated efforts to undermine sovereignty? The lack of clarity in this differentiation process is concerning, given the potential for overreach and misinterpretation.

Historical Precedents and Current Practices

The reference to a 2021 Graphika study, which positioned Guo  at the centre of a disinformation network, is used to support the current restrictions. Nonetheless, relying on historical precedents without transparent, current evidence leaves gaps in the justification for such severe measures. The Minister’s statement fails to explain how the findings of this study directly relate to the current situation or how these past actions specifically inform the present threat assessment.

Impact on Democratic Processes and Social Cohesion

The Minister warns that HICs can undermine democratic processes, sow discord, and reduce trust in public institutions. However, the explanation of how the 95 accounts in question specifically threaten these aspects of Singaporean society is insufficient. The statement implies a direct threat without detailing how these accounts’ activities have already affected or could potentially affect the country’s social and political fabric.

Ministerial Discretion and Oversight

The Minister for Home Affairs’ decision to issue Account Restriction Directions (ARDs) appears to rest heavily on subjective opinion, as permitted under section 21(1) of FICA.

Yet, the lack of a detailed explanation on how the Minister arrived at this opinion raises concerns about the extent of discretionary power and the mechanisms of oversight in such decisions. What specific indicators or intelligence led to the conclusion that these accounts are part of a coordinated foreign interference effort?

The Case of Guo Wengui

It is important to note that Guo Wengui had filed for bankruptcy in a U.S. court and was arrested in March of the previous year. He has been in jail since then. This raises further questions about the actual level of threat posed by these accounts.

How does the Minister assess the risk of interference from someone who is currently incarcerated and financially insolvent?

What kind of operational capacity could Guo’s network possibly have under these circumstances, and how is this risk being quantified and managed?

While Guo is incarcerated, his fanatic supporters remain active online, frequently sharing his old videos. However, these videos primarily focus on anti-CCP narratives and rarely touch on Singapore.

The Role of POFMA

Additionally, why isn’t the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) being used to address the falsehoods propagated by the actors listed?

If the content shared by these accounts is indeed false, POFMA would be the appropriate tool to counter these falsehoods directly. Is the Minister suggesting that no falsehoods were propagated, but the government still needs to act because of the potential influence that this information might create? This distinction is crucial, as it highlights whether the issue is with the veracity of the information or its potential impact.

MHA has also not explained why Guo is any more of a threat than other disinformation circulating around Singapore, including recent deepfakes imitating Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong, which also have not been subjected to POFMA directions for which the law was meant.

The Minister’s approach in addressing the potential threat from Guo Wengui’s network, while seemingly proactive, lacks transparency in its methodology and justification.

Clearer communication on the criteria, evidence, and processes involved in such significant decisions is crucial for maintaining public trust and ensuring that measures taken under FICA are both necessary and proportionate.

Singaporeans deserve a more detailed explanation to understand how their government distinguishes between genuine political discourse and coordinated foreign interference, particularly when the alleged threat is linked to an individual who is currently imprisoned and facing significant legal and financial constraints.

Furthermore, the decision not to utilize POFMA raises additional questions about the nature of the threat and the government’s strategy for addressing it.

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Opinion

LTA’s response to WP: Raising more questions on why they weren’t waived sooner?

Opinion: LTA’s recent response to the Workers’ Party’s claim about the S$10 ERP fee raises more questions than answers. While LTA attributes the grace period to features of ERP 2.0, the fee was initially for notifying motorists of missed payments, not processing them. If paperless systems existed since 2018, why weren’t fees waived earlier?

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The Land Transport Authority’s (LTA) recent Facebook post, meant to counter the Workers’ Party’s (WP) claim regarding the administrative fees for missed Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) charges, seems to have created more confusion than clarity.

On 30 August, The Land Transport Authority (LTA) announced that starting 1 October, motorists who miss an ERP payment will receive an SMS notification and be given a five-day grace period to make the payment without incurring the S$10 fee.

If the payment is not made within this grace period, LTA will issue a letter requiring the motorist to pay both the missed ERP charge and the S$10 fee. Failure to comply will result in a S$70 fine.

In a Facebook post on Monday (2 September), the WP highlighted the government’s apparent policy reversal concerning the S$10 administrative fee for missed ERP payments—a suggestion the WP had put forward in 2017.

WP MP Faisal Manap had asked then-Transport Minister Khaw Boon Wan whether the Ministry of Transport would consider allowing motorists to pay for failed ERP deductions electronically within a reasonable period, without incurring the admin fee or with a reduced fee.

Mr Khaw rejected the proposal, stating: “Motorists who miss the ERP payments are required to pay the administrative charge to cover the cost of processing the ERP violation, notification, and payment. It would not be fair for taxpayers to bear these costs on motorists’ behalf.”

Responding to WP in its Facebook post on Tuesday, the LTA stated: “Mr Khaw’s explanation remains valid, as it is indeed fairer for motorists who have ERP arrears to bear the administrative charges instead of the WP’s suggestion for taxpayers to bear these costs.”

The LTA further clarified that the recent announcement of a five-day grace period for missed ERP payments without incurring the S$10 fee was not equivalent to WP’s 2017 proposal, as the new policy does not ask taxpayers to cover the costs:

“We are now able to introduce the 5-day grace period because we re-designed our workflow to leverage on the capabilities provided by ERP2.0 to detect, notify and facilitate the missed payments. With ERP2.0, LTA will no longer need to process and send letters to motorists if they make payment within the 5-day grace period. Hence, we will not incur these administrative costs and do not need to impose the $10 administrative charge on motorists who pay within the grace period.”

While the LTA claims this new policy is made possible by technological advancements in ERP 2.0, their explanation raises a significant question: If the technology to eliminate the need for physical notifications and administrative fees was already available before 2024, why wasn’t this system adopted sooner?

In November 2018, it was reported that the Land Transport Authority (LTA) had moved to use electronic notifications for motoring-related transactions and facilitate online payment for its services. Instead of sending hardcopy letters for processes like road tax renewals, vehicle owners would receive updates through SMS or electronic letters via their One.Motoring accounts.

LTA’s press release states: “For instance, when it is time to renew a vehicle’s road tax, owners will receive an SMS alert to log on to the One.Motoring website using SingPass/CorpPass 2FA to retrieve their e-letters and complete the transaction.”

However, it is important to note that only statutory notices, such as summonses which are mandated by law, were explicitly stated to continue being sent in hardcopy. This exception was made clear in the LTA’s 2018 announcement.

Yet, the LTA’s recent explanation regarding ERP non-payment notifications does not mention this as a reason for not adopting a paperless approach earlier. This suggests that ERP non-payment notifications do not fall under the category of statutory notices, and therefore there appears to have been no legal requirement preventing the LTA from sending them electronically well before ERP 2.0’s introduction.

Given that the infrastructure for a paperless system had already been in place for years, the delay in transitioning to an electronic system for unpaid ERP fees remains perplexing. It is difficult to accept LTA’s claim that the five-day grace period and the removal of the administrative fee are entirely due to ERP 2.0 advancements.

The LTA’s 2024 response seems to contradict former Minister Khaw’s earlier stance, as the authority now acknowledges that ERP 2.0 will eliminate the administrative costs previously used to justify the fee.

This raises the question: If these costs could now be avoided, why were motorists charged for years after the technology to eliminate those costs became available?

Additionally, LTA’s post appears to downplay the significance of WP’s 2017 suggestion. While LTA argues that WP’s proposal would have unfairly burdened taxpayers, it is now evident that the administrative costs could have been reduced or even eliminated earlier without involving taxpayers during the shift to a paperless system.

The timing of this policy change, coinciding with the rollout of the unpopular ERP 2.0 system, suggests that LTA might be trying to ease public dissatisfaction with the new chunky three-piece system by offering this concession.

Transport Minister Chee Hong Tat’s comments following LTA’s announcement warrant further scrutiny. He described the decision as a “win-win” for both the government and motorists, saying: “It is a win-win outcome because for LTA, we save the trouble and we improve our productivity. We don’t have to process and send out the letters for the motorists.”

Mr Chee explained that the rollout of ERP 2.0 provides a “better way” for motorists to pay outstanding arrears without incurring additional administrative costs. The new system’s on-board unit (OBU) is connected to a backend system, allowing motorists to view and pay their arrears directly through the OBU display.

However, this explanation seems to conflate the purpose of the S$10 administrative fee. The fee was not directly about facilitating payment but rather about covering the cost of notifying motorists of their missed ERP payments and processing the payments. While ERP 2.0 may streamline the payment process, it does not directly address why motorists were previously charged an administrative fee for notifications when paperless systems were available.

Considering the S$2 price difference between cash/cheque payments and digital transactions as stated by Mr Khaw in his response to Mr Faisal, wouldn’t the cost of notification be S$8? This is, of course, setting aside the question of whether the processing of these payments should have been charged at all.

Although ERP 2.0 appears to be a positive development, it skirts the more pressing question: Why didn’t the LTA pursue the elimination of the administrative fee earlier, given the technology to send electronic notifications was already in place?

If this policy is indeed beneficial for both the government and motorists, why wasn’t it implemented when the technological capability first existed?

Notably, when rejecting WP’s proposal in 2017, Mr Khaw did not cite technological limitations. Instead, he justified the administrative fee as necessary to cover the costs of processing and notification—a justification that now seems outdated and irrelevant.

Therefore, contrary to LTA’s concluding statement in its Facebook post—”We hope the above explanation clarifies the facts and helps the public to understand what actually happened so they would not get confused by misleading claims”—the explanation does little to clarify the situation. In fact, it raises further doubts about the true motivations behind the recent policy change.

While the introduction of a five-day grace period and the waiving of the administrative fee may be presented as a positive step, the timing and reasoning behind it suggest that it could be more about managing public perception of ERP 2.0 than genuine policy improvement.

As a result, motorists and taxpayers are left wondering why they were made to shoulder these administrative costs for so long, despite the availability of technology that could have rendered them unnecessary years ago.

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Opinion

Is the shuttle bus service at Marine Parade town cluster just a S$1 million political ad campaign?

Opinion: The S$1 million Marine Parade shuttle bus service, with funding from the CDC and government grants, appears more like a political ad for the PAP than a public service, especially with MPs’ faces on the buses. If it’s quietly cancelled after the election, it might confirm suspicions about its true intent.

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The free shuttle bus service, a pilot project introduced in Marine Parade GRC, MacPherson, and Mountbatten (Marine Parade town cluster) is presented as a way to help residents, particularly seniors, navigate their neighbourhoods more easily, with an annual cost of approximately S$1 million, partially supported by the South East Community Development Council (CDC).
However, a closer look at the details surrounding its funding and usage raises questions about whether its true purpose is more about political advertising than community service.

A Moving Billboard for the People’s Action Party?

One significant question that has emerged is why the buses, meant to serve as public transport, prominently feature caricatures of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) MPs alongside local landmarks from Marine Parade GRC.

Gerald Giam, Workers’ Party Member of Parliament for Aljunied GRC, raised concerns about these depictions in Parliament on 7 August, questioning why a public service, which the government should provide, is being used to promote PAP MPs.

He asked, “Why are the Grassroots Advisors who are also People’s Action Party Members of Parliament fronting this service, for example, having their caricatures painted on the side of the buses and an article published in the petir.sg website, when public transport is something that should be provided by the Government through LTA and its public transport operators to all residents of Singapore?”

In response, Minister of State for Culture, Community, and Youth Alvin Tan explained, “The short answer is that there are pictures of other Marine Parade landmarks, including Wisma Geylang Serai Market and Old Airport Road Hawker Centre. These all help residents who would have familiarity with these landmarks and people who are familiar to them, to identify the buses.”

This was also mentioned by Mr Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Minister for Culture, Community, and Youth and an MP of Marine Parade GRC, who stated in a written reply that this is not dissimilar to other grassroots programmes, which have banners of the grassroots advisors hosting the programmes.

Former Workers’ Party Non-Constituency Member of Parliament Yee Jenn Jong sarcastically questioned the appropriateness of these images in a Facebook post, asking, “I can understand how buildings can be landmarks—are faces landmarks too?”

Empty Buses Raise Further Questions

Mr Tan also mentioned that over 10,000 residents have registered for the shuttle service, with more than 40% being seniors aged 65 and above.

However, Mr Yee pointed out the apparent low usage of the service, estimating that only about three to four passengers are on each bus trip. He questioned whether spending S$1 million on such a limited service is justifiable, especially when it seems to benefit only a small fraction of the residents.

Former Nominated Member of Parliament Anthea Ong has also publicly shared her observations of the shuttle buses being nearly empty on multiple occasions.

On Sunday, she posted a photo of an entirely empty bus, questioning the efficacy and necessity of the service. She emphasized the need for clear performance management and accountability measures, noting that if the service is not fulfilling its intended purpose, it should be reconsidered or terminated.

A volunteer from The Online Citizen (TOC) visited the site and reported similar findings, noting that the buses often appeared empty or poorly occupied.

Funding Ambiguities: Who Really Foots the Bill?

The funding arrangement for the shuttle service is also unclear.

Mr Tan explained in Parliament that the CDC provided a one-off seed grant of S$200,000 to kickstart the project.

The remaining 80% of the total cost comes from donations collected by the CDC and grassroots organizations, matched by government grants.

If the 80% funding is true, as described by Mr Tan, it suggests that 60% of the funds (20% seed-funding + 40% donations matching fund) came from the CDC, raising significant questions about transparency and accountability, particularly concerning the exact amount of public funds involved and how they are justified for what seems to be an underutilized service.

Election Advertising in Disguise?

This situation of the underutilised shuttle service and the use of donations along with public funding also raises potential legal and ethical concerns regarding election campaigning.

Under Singapore’s Parliamentary Election Act, the display of posters and banners for political candidates must be authorized and regulated. On top of that, expenses for such advertising must be declared under the act and be counted in the limit for the campaign budget.

Yet, these buses, adorned with images of PAP MPs, continue to operate, essentially serving as moving billboards.

This raises the question: will these buses be taken off the road during the election period, or will they continue to operate under the guise of a public service, giving the PAP an unfair advantage?

Furthermore, according to the electoral records from the Elections Department, the GRC and two SMCs have a combined total of 191,641 electors.

Based on the allowed budget of S$4 per elector, they can collectively spend up to S$766,564 on their campaign. The S$1 million shuttle bus service already exceeds this budget, not to mention that the campaign— which, to any ordinary member of the public, appears to have started before the close of nominations, which has yet to be determined.

Even more telling is that the shuttle buses are designed to only travel within the specific wards of Marine Parade GRC, MacPherson, and Mountbatten, without venturing outside of these areas.

This limitation makes the service less useful for residents who may need to travel beyond these boundaries. The routes seem to go in circles within the town, offering little practical benefit for those who need to go further.

This raises the suspicion that the shuttle service is more about keeping the PAP’s presence visible in the community, much like a political campaign ad that repetitively targets the same audience, rather than providing a meaningful transportation service.

Given the substantial cost and questionable usage of the Marine Parade shuttle bus service, it’s essential to scrutinize its real purpose.

Is it truly about helping residents, or is it a thinly veiled attempt to keep the PAP’s image front and centre in the community, conveniently ahead of the next election?

A telling sign will be if the upcoming election occurs while the shuttle bus service is still operational, only for the project to be quietly cancelled afterwards due to “financial non-viability.”

Such a scenario would strongly suggest that the service was, in reality, a political ad disguised as a public service, conveniently exempt from the election budget allocated to candidates.

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