Connect with us

Current Affairs

Suppressing Dissent?: The delayed POFMA strike against Yee Jenn Jong’s FB posts on AHTC and AIM

Published

on

The recent POFMA Correction Direction issued against former Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) Yee Jenn Jong raises serious questions about the justifications for allowing ministers to bypass the courts in the POFMA process.

Mr Yee, a former representative of the Workers’ Party (WP), was targeted after posting comments on Facebook regarding the Aljunied-Hougang Town Council (AHTC) saga and the Ministry of National Development’s (MND) actions. The Correction Direction, issued more than a month after Mr Yee’s posts, challenges the argument that bypassing judicial oversight through POFMA is necessary for swift action.

This case also underscores the troubling potential for POFMA to be used as a tool for the political suppression of opponents.

Mr Yee’s posts, which were critical of the PAP government’s handling of the AHTC saga and the involvement of Action Information Management Pte Ltd (AIM), a $2 company linked to the PAP, appear to have triggered the Correction Direction. POFMA grants the ruling party significant power—including during elections—to suppress dissent and control the narrative by allowing ministers to unilaterally decide what constitutes a falsehood without immediate court involvement.

This raises concerns that the law is being used not just to protect the public from misinformation, but also to silence political opponents who challenge the government’s actions.

On 26 August 2024, more than a month after Mr Yee’s original posts on 25 and 27 July, Minister for National Development Desmond Lee instructed the POFMA Office to issue a Correction Direction. The ministry claimed that Mr Yee’s posts contained “false and misleading statements” about MND’s motivations and actions during the AHTC saga—a long-standing legal battle that had finally been resolved through mediation.

Let’s first look at the content of Mr Yee’s posts, which led to the issuance of the Correction Directions.

In his 25 July post, following the conclusion of the AHTC lawsuits against the WP town councillors, which spanned over 9 years, Mr Yee wrote that he was sharing his personal comments, mostly from memory, over events that stretched nearly 14 years.

To summarize, these are the points Mr Yee made in his post:

AIM’s Role: AIM, a company owned by former Members of Parliament from the PAP, had the ability to deny a Town Council (TC) the use of computer software in opposition-run wards on very short notice. TC operations depend heavily on data for maintaining accurate records and making regular reports to the Ministry of National Development (MND).
Concerns About AIM’s Practices: A senior consultant from a major international firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions mentioned that a mechanism allowing an outgoing party to trigger destruction in a former company is highly inappropriate. AIM did not develop the original software; it was created by Horizon Technologies in the 1990s, a now-defunct publicly listed company. AIM took over the software shortly before the 2011 General Election.
Information Failures at AHTC: The Aljunied-Hougang Town Council (AHTC) started experiencing failures in reporting to MND and in their audits, potentially due to a poor handover from the outgoing PAP Town Council to the Workers’ Party (WP) Town Council.
Involvement of External Auditors: External audits were conducted, including one by the Auditor-General’s Office (AGO) and another by KPMG. Forensic audit tools were used, subjecting AHTC to intense scrutiny by numerous audit personnel over an extended period.
Withholding of Grants by MND: MND withheld millions of dollars in grants from the TC. Every TC in Singapore relies on these grants to remain solvent; without them, Service & Conservancy Charges (S&CC) would increase significantly, especially for smaller flats.
Accusations from MND: MND office bearers, including Khaw Boon Wan and Lawrence Wong, made accusations against AHPETC (which was renamed after the by-election was won). The TC was required to bring in an independent panel to secure the grants and avoid insolvency.
Independent Panel and Legal Proceedings: The independent panel, likely approved by MND, initiated a legal suit that lasted over seven years. The Court of Appeal overturned several initial guilty verdicts, highlighting that plaintiffs needed to prove actual losses.
Financial Claims and Legal Outcomes: The Court of Appeal ruled that the so-called $33 million spent on TC operations needed to be justified, with many claims struck out. Even where oversight failures were found, plaintiffs had to prove that another contractor would have resulted in lower costs. Many of these claims have since been dropped.

In his 27 July post, Mr Yee wrote, “An explanation to answer the fake news of ‘ownself sue ownself.’ The Independent Panel was appointed in compliance with a consent order by the Court of Appeal on 17 Feb 2017. And the background to this too was that millions of grant monies necessary for every TC in Singapore to stay operational were denied by MND to AHTC,” linking to the statements made by the town councillors and AHTC following the conclusion of the lawsuits.

In response to the posts, MND wrote that the statements made by Mr Yee regarding MND’s basis and motivation for actions previously taken against the Aljunied-Hougang Town Council (AHTC) were false and misleading.

These statements are:

MND was wrong to call in external auditors because it was Action Information Management Pte Ltd (AIM)’s termination of the Town Council Management System (TCMS) on insufficient notice and handover issues with the previous Aljunied TC (ATC) that led to AHTC’s failures in reporting to MND and its audit findings;
MND’s decision to withhold grants from AHTC, to call in external auditors, and to call for an independent panel (IP) were politically motivated and not based on legitimate concerns;
MND withheld grants from AHTC in order to put pressure on AHTC to appoint an IP; and
The IP members were decided by MND, and were not independent.

Without debating the veracity of MND’s claims, it is notable that MND does not contest the point that AIM had the ability to deny a Town Council (TC) the use of computer software in opposition-run wards on very short notice — given that this issue would surely be covered under MND’s purview.

If that’s true, wouldn’t the acquisition of the software have been politically driven to create trouble for the opposition party that won the town council from the PAP? And if the issues AHTC faced were indeed related to the impairment of the Town Council Management System (TCMS) software, wouldn’t that undermine MND’s justifications for withholding grants from AHTC, revealing a circular logic in the government’s reasoning?

But more than just the alleged falsehoods is how the POFMA direction issued by Minister Desmond Lee against Mr Yee, issued more than 30 days after his posts, raises serious questions about the supposed urgency that was a key justification for the POFMA’s passage in 2019.

If Mr Yee’s statements were truly false and harmful for public interest, why did the government wait so long to act? This delay calls into question the true motives behind the government’s use of POFMA and suggests that it may be more about controlling political discourse than protecting the public from falsehoods.

During the debate on POFMA’s enactment, Minister for Home Affairs and Law K Shanmugam argued that the law was necessary for quick action to prevent potential harm from falsehoods.

He provided dramatic examples where misinformation led to violence and economic disruption within hours, such as a false claim in Myanmar that incited mob violence within 24 hours, or a rumor in Indonesia that resulted in the burning of Buddhist temples.

Mr Shanmugam emphasized the need for speed, stating, “These are things where immediate Executive action will be necessary. It does not mean that the Ministers will move or act without consideration. The amount of consideration depends on the time that they can take; but it has to be quick.”

However, Mr Yee’s case demonstrates how POFMA’s application can be far from urgent, revealing a disconnect between the law’s original justification and its current use. The delay in issuing the Correction Direction suggests that the law is not really about preventing immediate harm but rather about using POFMA as a tool to suppress political dissent.

Moreover, this case is not an isolated instance. Looking at past POFMA directions, we see a pattern where many of these orders are issued days, or even weeks, after the statements in question are made. This reality contradicts the urgency that was so heavily emphasized during the law’s introduction. It illustrates that this so-called certainty of speed is selectively applied, depending on the political convenience of the ruling party.

Before POFMA, the PAP’s options for responding to statements like Mr Yee’s were limited.

The government could issue rebuttals, and the media would deliberate the merits of each side’s argument, allowing for balanced public discourse.

However, POFMA has drastically shifted the balance, granting ministers the power to issue correction orders without court approval. The media, which once played a critical role in examining and debating government actions, now often simply echoes the government’s position, effectively branding individuals or entities as purveyors of falsehoods based solely on a minister’s discretion.

And true enough, looking at the articles by Channel News Asia, Straits Times, and even Mothership, the pieces merely regurgitate what the POFMA office had to say about the alleged falsehoods without pointing to the original posts for readers to make up their own minds on whether the Ministry was right in its claims against Mr Yee.

Mr Yee’s opinions on the AIM saga provide a stark example of the political discourse that POFMA is being used to suppress.

AIM, a company with strong ties to the PAP, acquired the TCMS software—originally developed with public funds for PAP town councils—at a fraction of its value (considering its worth to the town councils and the cost of its development). After taking over the software, AIM leased it back to PAP town councils and retained the right to terminate the contract with any town council that experienced a “material change in composition,” a clause that would affect any opposition-held town council such as AHTC. These facts point to political interference, yet the discussion around them is now stifled by the government’s use of POFMA.

While the PAP government may argue that the courts are the ultimate arbiters of POFMA directions, past appeals have shown that the courts have limited room to maneuver, especially when the ministers’ interpretations of statements differ from the intended meaning of the communicator. This situation is particularly troubling because it allows the government to control the narrative without meaningful checks and balances, effectively silencing dissent and shaping public perception to its advantage.

Minister Shanmugam, during the POFMA debate, dismissed concerns about the law concentrating too much power in the hands of ministers, arguing that it was a “completely defensible, open system that places no great power within the Executive.” He contended that the government’s approach allowed for “certainty of speed,” whereas the Workers’ Party’s proposal to involve the courts from the start would complicate and delay the process. Yet, the situation with Mr Yee illustrates that this so-called certainty of speed is selectively applied, depending on the political convenience of the ruling party, particularly when we look at past instances of POFMA directions and see that most of them are issued more than a day, and many over a week or more, after the statements were made.

The POFMA direction against Mr Yee Jenn Jong not only calls into question the original intent behind the law but also exposes the dangers of granting unchecked power to the executive branch.

The delay in issuing the correction order, combined with the political context of the AIM controversy, suggests that POFMA is being used less as a tool for truth and more as a weapon for political control. This perception is increasingly held by members of the public, as observed from the comments section of the local media. But does the PAP care? Probably not, given the manner in which they are churning out POFMA directions.

Perhaps it’s all about keeping promises to the people. Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Senior Minister and former Prime Minister, said in 2006 that the opposition’s job was “to make life miserable” for him and if there were 10 or more of them in Parliament, he would have to spend time “thinking what is the right way to fix them.”

While SM Lee made his apology, the point is well remembered by Singaporeans.

The post Suppressing Dissent?: The delayed POFMA strike against Yee Jenn Jong’s FB posts on AHTC and AIM appeared first on Gutzy Asia.

Continue Reading
Click to comment
Subscribe
Notify of
0 Comments
Newest
Oldest Most Voted
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments

Current Affairs

Reforming Singapore’s defamation laws: Preventing legal weapons against free speech

Opinion: The tragic suicide of Geno Ong, linked to the financial stress from a defamation lawsuit, raises a critical issue: Singapore’s defamation laws need reform. These laws must not be weaponized to silence individuals.

Published

on

by Alexandar Chia

This week, we hear the tragic story of the suicide of Geno Ong, with Ong citing the financial stress from the defamation lawsuit against her by Raymond Ng and Iris Koh.

Regardless of who’s right and who’s wrong, this Koh/Ng vs Ong affair raises a wider question at play – the issue of Singapore’s defamation laws and how it needs to be tightened.

Why is this needed? This is because defamation suits cannot be weaponised the way they have been in Singapore law. It cannot be used to threaten people into “shutting up”.

Article 14(2)(a) of the Constitution may permit laws to be passed to restrict free speech in the area of defamation, but it does not remove the fact that Article 14(1)(a) is still law, and it permits freedom of speech.

As such, although Article 14(2)(a) allows restrictions to be placed on freedom of speech with regard to the issue of defamation, it must not be to the extent where Article 14(1)(a)’s rights and liberties are not curtailed completely or heavily infringed on.

Sadly, that is the case with regard to precedence in defamation suits.

Let’s have a look at the defamation suit then-PM Goh Chok Tong filed against Dr Chee Soon Juan after GE 2001 for questions Dr Chee asked publicly about a $17 billion loan made to Suharto.

If we look at point 12 of the above link, in the “lawyer’s letter” sent to Dr Chee, Goh’s case of himself being defamed centred on lines Dr Chee used in his question, such as “you can run but you can’t hide”, and “did he not tell you about the $17 billion loan”?

In the West, such lines of questioning are easily understood at worse as hyperbolically figurative expressions with the gist of the meaning behind such questioning on why the loan to Suharto was made.

Unfortunately, Singapore’s defamation laws saw Dr Chee’s actions of imputing ill motives on Goh, when in the West, it is expected of incumbents to take the kind of questions Dr Chee asked, and such questions asked of incumbent office holders are not uncommon.

And the law permits pretty flimsy reasons such as “withdrawal of allegations” to be used as a deciding factor if a statement is defamatory or not – this is as per points 66-69 of the judgement.

This is not to imply or impute ill intent on Singapore courts. Rather, it shows how defamation laws in Singapore needs to be tightened, to ensure that a possible future scenario where it is weaponised as a “shut-up tool”, occurs.

These are how I suggest it is to be done –

  1. The law has to make mandatory, that for a case to go into a full lawsuit, there has to be a 3-round exchange of talking points and two attempts at legal mediation.
  2. Summary judgment should be banned from defamation suits, unless if one party fails to adduce evidence or a defence.
  3. A statement is to be proven false, hence, defamatory, if there is strictly material along with circumstantial evidence showing that the statement is false. Apologies and related should not be used as main determinants, given how many of these statements are made in the heat of the moment, from the natural feelings of threat and intimidation from a defamation suit.
  4. A question should only be considered defamatory if it has been repeated, after material facts of evidence are produced showing, beyond reasonable doubt, that the message behind the question, is “not so”, and if there is a directly mentioned subject in the question. For example, if an Opposition MP, Mr A, was found to be poisoned with a banned substance, and I ask openly on how Mr A got access to that substance, given that its banned, I can’t be found to have “defamed the government” with the question as 1) the government was not mentioned directly and 2) if the government has not produced material evidence that they indeed had no role in the poisoning affair, if they were directly mentioned.
  5. Damages should be tiered, with these tiers coded into the Defamation Act – the highest quantum of damages (i.e. those of a six-figured nature) is only to be reserved if the subject of defamation lost any form of office, revenue or position, or directly quantifiable public standing, or was subjected to criminal action, because of the act of defamation. If none of such occur, the maximum amount of damages a plaintiff in a defamation can claim is a 4-figure amount capped at $2000. This will prevent rich and powerful figures from using defamation suits and 6-figure damages to intimidate their questioners and detractors.
  6. All defendants of defamation suit should be allowed full access to legal aid schemes.

Again, this piece does not suggest bad-faith malpractice by the courts in Singapore. Rather, it is to suggest how to tighten up defamation laws to avoid it being used as the silencing hatchet.

Continue Reading

Current Affairs

Man arrested for alleged housebreaking and theft of mobile phones in Yishun

A 23-year-old man was arrested for allegedly breaking into a Yishun Ring Road rental flat and stealing eight mobile phones worth S$3,400 from five tenants. The Singapore Police responded swiftly on 1 September, identifying and apprehending the suspect on the same day. The man has been charged with housebreaking, which carries a potential 10-year jail term.

Published

on

SINGAPORE: A 23-year-old man has been arrested for allegedly breaking into a rental flat along Yishun Ring Road and stealing eight mobile phones from five tenants.

The incident occurred in the early hours on Sunday (1 September), according to a statement from the Singapore Police Force.

The authorities reported that they received a call for assistance at around 5 a.m. on that day.

Officers from the Woodlands Police Division quickly responded and, through ground enquiries and police camera footage, were able to identify and apprehend the suspect on the same day.

The stolen mobile phones, with an estimated total value of approximately S$3,400, were recovered hidden under a nearby bin.

The suspect was charged in court on Monday with housebreaking with the intent to commit theft.

If convicted, he could face a jail term of up to 10 years and a fine.

In light of this incident, the police have advised property owners to take precautions to prevent similar crimes.

They recommend securing all doors, windows, and other openings with good quality grilles and padlocks when leaving premises unattended, even for short periods.

The installation of burglar alarms, motion sensor lights, and CCTV cameras to cover access points is also advised. Additionally, residents are urged to avoid keeping large sums of cash and valuables in their homes.

The investigation is ongoing.

Last month, police disclosed that a recent uptick in housebreaking incidents in private residential estates across Singapore has been traced to foreign syndicates, primarily involving Chinese nationals.

Preliminary investigations indicate that these syndicates operate in small groups, targeting homes by scaling perimeter walls or fences.

The suspects are believed to be transient travelers who enter Singapore on Social Visit Passes, typically just a day or two before committing the crimes.

Before this recent surge in break-ins, housebreaking cases were on the decline, with 59 reported in the first half of this year compared to 70 during the same period last year.

However, between 1 June and 4 August 2024, there were 10 reported housebreaking incidents, predominantly in private estates around the Rail Corridor and Bukit Timah Road.

The SPF has intensified efforts to engage residents near high-risk areas by distributing crime prevention advisories, erecting alert signs, and training them to patrol their neighborhoods, leading to an increase in reports of suspicious activity.

Continue Reading

Trending