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LTA’s response to WP: Raising more questions on why they weren’t waived sooner?

Opinion: LTA’s recent response to the Workers’ Party’s claim about the S$10 ERP fee raises more questions than answers. While LTA attributes the grace period to features of ERP 2.0, the fee was initially for notifying motorists of missed payments, not processing them. If paperless systems existed since 2018, why weren’t fees waived earlier?

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The Land Transport Authority’s (LTA) recent Facebook post, meant to counter the Workers’ Party’s (WP) claim regarding the administrative fees for missed Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) charges, seems to have created more confusion than clarity.

On 30 August, The Land Transport Authority (LTA) announced that starting 1 October, motorists who miss an ERP payment will receive an SMS notification and be given a five-day grace period to make the payment without incurring the S$10 fee.

If the payment is not made within this grace period, LTA will issue a letter requiring the motorist to pay both the missed ERP charge and the S$10 fee. Failure to comply will result in a S$70 fine.

In a Facebook post on Monday (2 September), the WP highlighted the government’s apparent policy reversal concerning the S$10 administrative fee for missed ERP payments—a suggestion the WP had put forward in 2017.

WP MP Faisal Manap had asked then-Transport Minister Khaw Boon Wan whether the Ministry of Transport would consider allowing motorists to pay for failed ERP deductions electronically within a reasonable period, without incurring the admin fee or with a reduced fee.

Mr Khaw rejected the proposal, stating: “Motorists who miss the ERP payments are required to pay the administrative charge to cover the cost of processing the ERP violation, notification, and payment. It would not be fair for taxpayers to bear these costs on motorists’ behalf.”

Responding to WP in its Facebook post on Tuesday, the LTA stated: “Mr Khaw’s explanation remains valid, as it is indeed fairer for motorists who have ERP arrears to bear the administrative charges instead of the WP’s suggestion for taxpayers to bear these costs.”

The LTA further clarified that the recent announcement of a five-day grace period for missed ERP payments without incurring the S$10 fee was not equivalent to WP’s 2017 proposal, as the new policy does not ask taxpayers to cover the costs:

“We are now able to introduce the 5-day grace period because we re-designed our workflow to leverage on the capabilities provided by ERP2.0 to detect, notify and facilitate the missed payments. With ERP2.0, LTA will no longer need to process and send letters to motorists if they make payment within the 5-day grace period. Hence, we will not incur these administrative costs and do not need to impose the $10 administrative charge on motorists who pay within the grace period.”

While the LTA claims this new policy is made possible by technological advancements in ERP 2.0, their explanation raises a significant question: If the technology to eliminate the need for physical notifications and administrative fees was already available before 2024, why wasn’t this system adopted sooner?

In November 2018, it was reported that the Land Transport Authority (LTA) had moved to use electronic notifications for motoring-related transactions and facilitate online payment for its services. Instead of sending hardcopy letters for processes like road tax renewals, vehicle owners would receive updates through SMS or electronic letters via their One.Motoring accounts.

LTA’s press release states: “For instance, when it is time to renew a vehicle’s road tax, owners will receive an SMS alert to log on to the One.Motoring website using SingPass/CorpPass 2FA to retrieve their e-letters and complete the transaction.”

However, it is important to note that only statutory notices, such as summonses which are mandated by law, were explicitly stated to continue being sent in hardcopy. This exception was made clear in the LTA’s 2018 announcement.

Yet, the LTA’s recent explanation regarding ERP non-payment notifications does not mention this as a reason for not adopting a paperless approach earlier. This suggests that ERP non-payment notifications do not fall under the category of statutory notices, and therefore there appears to have been no legal requirement preventing the LTA from sending them electronically well before ERP 2.0’s introduction.

Given that the infrastructure for a paperless system had already been in place for years, the delay in transitioning to an electronic system for unpaid ERP fees remains perplexing. It is difficult to accept LTA’s claim that the five-day grace period and the removal of the administrative fee are entirely due to ERP 2.0 advancements.

The LTA’s 2024 response seems to contradict former Minister Khaw’s earlier stance, as the authority now acknowledges that ERP 2.0 will eliminate the administrative costs previously used to justify the fee.

This raises the question: If these costs could now be avoided, why were motorists charged for years after the technology to eliminate those costs became available?

Additionally, LTA’s post appears to downplay the significance of WP’s 2017 suggestion. While LTA argues that WP’s proposal would have unfairly burdened taxpayers, it is now evident that the administrative costs could have been reduced or even eliminated earlier without involving taxpayers during the shift to a paperless system.

The timing of this policy change, coinciding with the rollout of the unpopular ERP 2.0 system, suggests that LTA might be trying to ease public dissatisfaction with the new chunky three-piece system by offering this concession.

Transport Minister Chee Hong Tat’s comments following LTA’s announcement warrant further scrutiny. He described the decision as a “win-win” for both the government and motorists, saying: “It is a win-win outcome because for LTA, we save the trouble and we improve our productivity. We don’t have to process and send out the letters for the motorists.”

Mr Chee explained that the rollout of ERP 2.0 provides a “better way” for motorists to pay outstanding arrears without incurring additional administrative costs. The new system’s on-board unit (OBU) is connected to a backend system, allowing motorists to view and pay their arrears directly through the OBU display.

However, this explanation seems to conflate the purpose of the S$10 administrative fee. The fee was not directly about facilitating payment but rather about covering the cost of notifying motorists of their missed ERP payments and processing the payments. While ERP 2.0 may streamline the payment process, it does not directly address why motorists were previously charged an administrative fee for notifications when paperless systems were available.

Considering the S$2 price difference between cash/cheque payments and digital transactions as stated by Mr Khaw in his response to Mr Faisal, wouldn’t the cost of notification be S$8? This is, of course, setting aside the question of whether the processing of these payments should have been charged at all.

Although ERP 2.0 appears to be a positive development, it skirts the more pressing question: Why didn’t the LTA pursue the elimination of the administrative fee earlier, given the technology to send electronic notifications was already in place?

If this policy is indeed beneficial for both the government and motorists, why wasn’t it implemented when the technological capability first existed?

Notably, when rejecting WP’s proposal in 2017, Mr Khaw did not cite technological limitations. Instead, he justified the administrative fee as necessary to cover the costs of processing and notification—a justification that now seems outdated and irrelevant.

Therefore, contrary to LTA’s concluding statement in its Facebook post—”We hope the above explanation clarifies the facts and helps the public to understand what actually happened so they would not get confused by misleading claims”—the explanation does little to clarify the situation. In fact, it raises further doubts about the true motivations behind the recent policy change.

While the introduction of a five-day grace period and the waiving of the administrative fee may be presented as a positive step, the timing and reasoning behind it suggest that it could be more about managing public perception of ERP 2.0 than genuine policy improvement.

As a result, motorists and taxpayers are left wondering why they were made to shoulder these administrative costs for so long, despite the availability of technology that could have rendered them unnecessary years ago.

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Opinion

A tragic reminder: The urgent need for defamation law reform in Singapore

Opinion: The tragic suicide of Geno Ong highlights the emotional and financial toll of defamation lawsuits in Singapore, where plaintiffs often aren’t required to prove reputational damage. Her case, alongside others, calls for urgent reform to ensure fairer balance between protecting reputation and free speech.

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The recent suicide of Geno Ong has once again cast a spotlight on the nature of defamation laws in Singapore and the pressures they exert on those caught in legal battles.

Ong’s tragic note, accusing businessman Raymond Ng of financially and emotionally breaking her through lawsuits, reflects the personal toll of defamation cases in a jurisdiction where proving damage to reputation is not always required.

This backdrop invites a broader reflection on how defamation laws in Singapore are structured, particularly when compared to other legal systems like the UK’s.

In the UK, as seen in the recent case of British billionaire Sir James Dyson, courts demand that plaintiffs demonstrate significant reputational harm.

Dyson lost his defamation case against the Daily Mirror because he could not prove any financial loss stemming from the publication. This standard, established under the UK’s Defamation Act 2013, creates a higher threshold for plaintiffs, emphasizing the need to show serious damage.

In contrast, Singapore’s defamation laws, as demonstrated in the recent legal victory of Singaporean Ministers K Shanmugam and Vivian Balakrishnan against Lee Hsien Yang (LHY), do not require proof of reputational damage.

The Ministers successfully argued that LHY’s Facebook post insinuated corrupt practices, even though LHY maintained that his post did not imply personal benefit or corruption. The Singapore court sided with the Ministers, and LHY did not pursue a counterclaim.

Comparing Legal Standards: Singapore vs. the UK

This divergence between the UK and Singapore is stark. While Sir James Dyson’s lawsuit was dismissed due to a lack of evidence of financial loss, the Singaporean Ministers’ lawsuit prevailed based on the interpretation of a Facebook post, with no need to prove actual harm.

In Singapore, it is often the defendant’s responsibility to disprove the defamation, a legal structure that may make it easier for powerful individuals to pursue and win defamation suits.

For critics, this represents a significant flaw in Singapore’s defamation laws, as the threshold for sustaining defamation suits is relatively low. Plaintiffs in Singapore are not required to show reputational damage or financial loss, leading to concerns that defamation laws may be used by the wealthy and powerful to silence critics, rather than to address legitimate harm.

The Impact on Free Speech and Public Discourse

These cases raise important questions about the balance between protecting individuals from defamation and safeguarding freedom of speech.

In the case of LHY, one might question what reputational harm the Ministers could have suffered when they remained in power and continued to be elected by the public.

Should defamation lawsuits be used when public figures face criticism in a democratic society? These legal actions, especially when successful, may have a chilling effect on free speech, discouraging citizens from voicing concerns about public figures for fear of legal retaliation.

Similarly, in the case of Geno Ong, Raymond Ng’s defamation lawsuits against her raise significant questions about the actual damage to his reputation.

Ong’s accusations, while serious, appeared to target a niche social media audience and did not seem to widely impact Ng’s standing or business operations.

Given his continued involvement in business, it becomes difficult to argue that Ng’s reputation suffered substantial harm from Ong’s posts. This situation echoes broader concerns about Singapore’s defamation laws, where plaintiffs are not required to show clear evidence of reputational damage to succeed in their claims.

Moreover, the Ministers chose to serve LHY legal papers in the UK, a jurisdiction with a higher threshold for defamation claims, through social messaging rather than physical service.

This decision, and the Ministers’ choice to pursue the case in Singapore rather than the UK, where the case might have been dismissed, raises concerns about fairness. Critics suggest that Singapore’s legal framework, influenced by long-standing laws and political structures, favours those in positions of power.

The Future of Defamation Laws in Singapore

The contrast between the Dyson case in the UK and the Ministers’ case in Singapore demonstrates how defamation laws in different jurisdictions can lead to significantly different outcomes.

In the UK, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove serious harm, offering greater protection to free speech. In Singapore, the burden often shifts to the defendant, creating a system where plaintiffs in positions of power can more easily sue for defamation without showing significant damage.

Without legislative reforms, defamation laws in Singapore may continue to be seen as tools that can be used by those in power to suppress criticism, stifling public discourse.

Geno Ong’s case, while rooted in personal tragedy, highlights the emotional and financial toll that defamation suits can have on ordinary individuals.

Ong’s story, alongside high-profile cases like those involving the Ministers and LHY, underscores the need for a deeper conversation about the purpose and fairness of defamation laws in Singapore.

Ultimately, Singapore must grapple with the question of whether its defamation laws strike the right balance between protecting reputations and upholding freedom of speech in a democratic society.

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Opinion

Charity or Campaigning?: The blurred line between aid and political influence in Singapore

Opinion: The intersection of charity and politics in Singapore raises questions when politicians appear at events like grocery distributions. While well-intentioned, such appearances can blur lines, influencing vulnerable voters who may associate aid with political figures, impacting free and fair competition.

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The intersection of charity work and politics is a sensitive topic, particularly when voluntary organisations and political figures come together to distribute handouts.

In Singapore, where elections often see the People’s Action Party (PAP) dominate constituencies, these charity-driven distributions, whether intentional or not, sometimes blur the lines between volunteerism and political campaigning.

Grace Fu, a PAP politician representing Yuhua Single Member Constituency (SMC), posted on her Facebook page on 27 August, highlighting an event where student volunteers distributed groceries and household essentials to the residents of Yuhua.

This initiative, organised by the South West Community Development Council (CDC) and HRHS (好人好事), saw volunteers working to help defray living costs for residents.

While the post emphasized the role of kindness, the optics of Fu personally being present to hand out groceries may give rise to questions about the intent behind such appearances.

You can see similar events where Ms Fu is seen along with handouts by charitable organisations to residents in Yuhua.

This brings to mind a conversation I had with Robin Low, the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) candidate who ran against Fu in the 2020 General Election.

Low shared his hopefulness during the campaign, buoyed by residents expressing dissatisfaction with the status quo and support for the SDP’s platform. Yet, despite this apparent backing, he was disheartened with the final results, receiving only 29.46% of the vote, a marginal improvement over the 2015 results but a step back from the 2011 outcome.

Low’s experience post-election provides a striking insight into how residents may interpret acts of charity. As he went back to thank voters, he had a conversation with one resident who had expressed support for SDP during the campaign.

When asked why he ultimately voted for Fu, the resident admitted that his decision was influenced by the gratitude he felt for a bag of rice he received, mistakenly believing it came from Fu herself. Low tried to explain that the rice was actually from the NGOs involved in the event, but the resident was confused, noting that Fu was present during the distribution.

This anecdote, while personal, illustrates a broader challenge in Singapore’s political landscape.

While the distribution of goods is often driven by NGOs and charitable causes, the close proximity of politicians to these events can leave a lasting impression on residents—one that may influence voting decisions, particularly among the poor.

For some, the gratitude felt for these handouts, even if provided by a neutral third party, can be transferred to the political figures who appear during the distribution.

This, in turn, complicates the narrative of free and fair political competition, especially when residents are left unclear as to the true source of the support.

The perception that politicians are directly responsible for handouts, whether accurate or not, can sway the votes of the more vulnerable populations who feel a sense of obligation or gratitude for this perceived generosity.

For poorer residents, the immediate and tangible relief from a bag of rice or household essentials may outweigh the less immediate and often abstract promises made during political campaigns. It highlights how acts of charity, even when unintentional, can play a powerful role in shaping electoral outcomes.

This scenario raises questions about the ethical implications of politicians being present at charitable distributions.

While these events can genuinely benefit residents, they also risk being seen as part of a larger campaign strategy, where goodwill is exchanged for political support. It is a complex dynamic that touches on the heart of political ethics in Singapore and calls for clearer boundaries between voluntary aid and electoral influence.

In a broader sense, this reflection encourages us to consider how the provision of aid, particularly to the poor, can be seen as a tool of influence.

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