In an attempt to explain why corruption charges against former transport minister S Iswaran under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) were dropped, the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) cited challenges in prosecuting him under the act.

The AGC argued that proving corruption would be difficult, given that both Iswaran and property tycoon Ong Beng Seng would be unlikely to implicate themselves.

This explanation is surprising, given the provisions of Section 8 of the PCA. For those charged under Sections 5 or 6, the law presumes corruption once a public officer receives any form of gratification, placing the burden on the accused to disprove corrupt intent.

Since Iswaran was charged with two counts of corruption under Section 6(a), read with Section 7 of the PCA, the legal framework should have facilitated, rather than complicated, the prosecution’s task in this case.

More perplexing is the AGC’s decision to amend the charges, ultimately charging Iswaran under Section 165 of the Penal Code rather than under the PCA, effectively removing the corruption charges altogether.

Notably, this is the first time in Singapore’s 153-year history that Section 165 has been invoked. Section 165 addresses the acceptance of valuable items by public officials without requiring proof of corrupt intent, and it carries significantly lighter penalties—just two years’ imprisonment compared to the seven years possible under the PCA for corruption charges.

While the AGC cited “litigation risks” in proving the PCA charges beyond a reasonable doubt, this explanation seems to sidestep the fact that the PCA presumes corrupt intent once gratification is accepted by a public official.

The AGC also stated to the media, “AGC also considered whether the amendment would lead to a fair and just outcome that is in line with the public interest.”

But is the public interest better served by reducing the severity of the charges? Or does this decision represent an overly cautious approach to a case that, on the surface, appears to meet the conditions for prosecution under the PCA?

The AGC’s decision becomes even more questionable when considering the total value and scope of the gifts involved.

These gifts, valued at over S$218,000 from Ong alone, were not casual or one-off gestures but involved high-value items, including tickets to the Singapore F1 Grand Prix, football matches, and exclusive theatre performances, alongside luxury golf equipment, expensive whisky, and a high-end bicycle.

From November 2015 to December 2021, Iswaran allegedly received 24 valuable gifts exceeding S$384,000 (US$285,000) in value from Ong, often tied to the business dealings related to his official role as Chairman of the F1 Steering Committee.

Similarly, between November 2021 and November 2022, Iswaran allegedly accepted several expensive items worth S$18,920.94 from David Lum Kok Seng, managing director of construction firm Lum Chang Holdings (LCH), including whisky, wine, and golf equipment, during a period when Mr Lum’s company was managing a major contract for the Land Transport Authority.

These transactions were far from casual or isolated. Iswaran did not merely receive a token gift on a single occasion—he received a series of high-value items over several years, all from individuals with business interests directly tied to his official roles, raising significant concerns about conflicts of interest.

Given the substantial value and frequency of these gifts, Iswaran’s acceptance of them is far from a minor infraction that Section 165 might traditionally address.

This is especially concerning when considering that civil servants in Singapore are prohibited from retaining gifts worth more than S$50 and must declare any gifts received from external stakeholders to their permanent secretaries.

Iswaran’s failure to report these substantial gifts only heightens concerns about the AGC’s decision to amend the charges to the lesser offence.

While the AGC’s caution in considering “litigation risks” is understandable, the presumption of corruption under Section 8 of the PCA would have shifted the burden to Iswaran to prove that these extensive gifts were not corruptly given.

In this context, the unprecedented use of Section 165 seems out of place, given the clear legal mechanisms provided under the PCA for such cases.

A comparison with the case of Wee Toon Boon, the former Minister of State for the Environment, is instructive.

In 1975, Wee was found guilty on five charges of corruption, similarly under Section 6(a) of the PCA, and was sentenced to four years and six months in prison and fined S$7,023—later reduced to 18 months upon appeal after a three-year sentence for one charge was quashed.

The judge ruled that Wee had failed to cast reasonable doubt and concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that he accepted gratifications as rewards for favours shown.

Notably, Wee received a six-month sentence simply for accepting S$3,500 (roughly S$11,410 in 2023, adjusted for inflation) worth of galvanized roofing for his house.

Given the overlapping relationships between Iswaran, Ong, and Lum during Iswaran’s time in office and the undeniable acceptance of extravagant gifts, it raises the question: why is it considered challenging to prosecute Iswaran, given the presumption of corruption in Section 8 of the PCA?

Considering the above, Deputy Attorney-General Tai Wei Shyong’s assertion in court that there was a strong basis for originally bringing the corruption charges appears valid.

Therefore, it is baffling and difficult to understand why the AGC chose to withdraw the charges at the eleventh hour, citing possible difficulties when the burden of proof is not on its side. Equally puzzling is how Iswaran, after professing his innocence for months, so unexpectedly agreed to plead guilty to the amended charges.

Public expectations for transparency and accountability are understandably high in a case involving a senior public official. The decision to downgrade the charges, particularly when stronger anti-corruption laws were available, risks undermining public confidence in the judicial process.

In an unexpected turn of events, the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) reduced the corruption charges against former Transport Minister S Iswaran to lesser offences under Section 165 of the Penal Code just before what would have been a historic trial of a political officeholder.

Iswaran was initially charged in January 2024 for allegedly receiving gifts worth approximately S$384,000 from Ong Beng Seng in exchange for advancing Ong’s business interests, particularly related to the Singapore Grand Prix.

Additional charges followed in March 2024, accusing Iswaran of receiving valuable items—including whisky bottles, golf clubs, and a Brompton bicycle—from David Lum Kok Seng, managing director of Lum Chang Holdings.

These items, valued at approximately S$19,000, were linked to Iswaran’s role as Transport Minister, bringing the total value of gifts to over S$400,000 and the total number of charges to 35, including corruption and obstruction of justice.

However, just before the trial was set to begin, the AGC made a significant decision to amend the charges. The more serious corruption charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act were reduced to lesser offences under Section 165 of the Penal Code, which deals with public servants receiving valuable gifts without corrupt intent.

As a result, the corruption charges were effectively removed, and Iswaran pleaded guilty to the revised charges after months of maintaining his innocence.

In its statement to the media on Tuesday, the AGC cited significant challenges in proving the original corruption case beyond a reasonable doubt.

It stated that both Iswaran and businessman Ong Beng Seng would need to implicate themselves to establish corrupt intent, posing litigation risks.

While the AGC provided reasons for dropping the charges against Iswaran, it raises an important question: Why did the AGC press corruption charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) not once but twice if these evidentiary challenges were known from the start?

The AGC’s rationale—difficulty in proving corrupt intent—should have been foreseeable when the charges were initially brought forward.

Ong and Iswaran, including Lum, all had a vested interest in denying the allegations, which would make conviction difficult. Nevertheless, the AGC proceeded with the charges twice, only to backtrack on the day of the trial itself, according to the prosecution, when asked in court by Justice Vincent Hoong.

If these concerns of litigation risks were apparent from the outset, why were the charges filed under the more severe PCA in the first place? Was this a mistake?

Apparently not, as Deputy Attorney General Tai Wei Shyong clarified in court that the corruption charges against Iswaran were not withdrawn but amended, and reiterated that there was a strong basis for why they were originally brought.

That begs the question: Why amend the charges then?

This puzzling approach mirrors the AGC’s handling of the Keppel Offshore & Marine (KOM) bribery case, where six senior executives were issued stern warnings but not prosecuted after five years of investigation.

Minister Indranee Rajah explained in Parliament that the AGC and the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) faced similar evidentiary difficulties, citing insufficient proof to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The KOM case involved cross-border transactions, which authorities claimed made it difficult to secure witness testimony or documentary evidence that could hold up in court.

Despite a U.S. investigation resulting in a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Keppel admitting to the charges against it and a US$422 million fine, the AGC found that references to individual actions in the DPA were insufficient to support prosecution in Singapore.

Foreign witnesses allegedly refused to testify, and key individuals denied knowing that commissions paid were used as bribes.

Ultimately, the AGC issued stern warnings as an “in-between” measure, suggesting that while there was insufficient evidence for prosecution, the individuals involved were not entirely “off the hook.”

The similarities between the Iswaran case and the KOM scandal raise broader questions about the AGC’s consistency in applying its prosecutorial discretion. In both cases, the decisions to scale back or drop charges are said to be due to alleged insufficient evidence after lengthy investigations.

But shouldn’t public prosecutions prioritize ensuring that justice is being sought by allowing the facts to be fully examined in court, even if securing convictions isn’t guaranteed—especially to promote public awareness and reinforce Singapore’s strong zero-tolerance policy on corruption?

In Iswaran’s case, the decision to amend the charges could be seen as a pragmatic move by prosecutors to avoid a lengthy and costly trial with uncertain outcomes. However, for the public, this creates a perception of inconsistency in how different cases are pursued.

This perception is reinforced by the AGC’s decision to prosecute opposition leader Pritam Singh for allegedly lying under oath to a parliamentary committee, relying solely on the testimony of a former Member of Parliament who had confessed to lying.

Why does Singh’s case appear more straightforward to convict than Iswaran’s, without similar evidentiary challenges, when the prosecution primarily relies on verbal testimony? In contrast, in Iswaran’s case, the gifts from Ong and Lum were undeniable and proven, yet the AGC chose to amend the charges due to difficulties in proving corrupt intent.

Iswaran is set to face sentencing on 3 October 2024, with the prosecution seeking 6-7 months of imprisonment while Iswaran’s defence is seeking a maximum term of 8 weeks.

Regardless of the sentence, the fundamental question remains: Why did the AGC pursue corruption charges in the first place, only to drop them at the last minute, despite citing evidentiary concerns?