In 2016, the privatization of SMRT under the ownership of Temasek Holdings was defended vigorously with promises of greater focus on long-term strategic goals rather than short-term market pressures.

This move was touted as a necessity to enable SMRT to tackle the evolving challenges of Singapore’s public transport needs, particularly the maintenance of an ageing rail system following the 2011 breakdowns that saw the resignation of Saw Phaik Hwa, who prioritised on the development of the transport, company’s retail business and skimming on maintenance expenses.

Temasek, in its announcement, said, “Privatisation will provide SMRT with greater flexibility to focus on its primary role of delivering safe and high-quality rail service, without short-term pressures of being a listed company, in the midst of its transition to a new regulatory framework under the New Rail Financing Framework.”

However, with recent developments, particularly the massive 2023 rail disruption that we are seeing for the East-West Line, questions arise: Has privatization truly served its stated purpose, or has it instead cloaked critical operational details from public scrutiny?

Transparency and Its Implications

The annual reports published by SMRT before and after its privatization tell a tale of changing transparency levels.

Pre-privatization, the 2016 report was replete with details about executive remuneration, specific maintenance expenditures, and breakdowns of revenue and expenses.

Such transparency empowered stakeholders to understand where and how funds were being allocated, particularly towards crucial maintenance operations and how much the top executives were being paid.

Post-privatization, after being delisted from the Singapore Stock Exchange, these details have become conspicuously sparse.

The 2023 report, for example, lacks detailed disclosures about how much is spent on maintenance and whether these activities are handled in-house or outsourced to subcontractors.

What we have now is just a chunk of text outlining SMRT’s policies on remuneration and maintenance.

Such omissions not only cloud stakeholder understanding but also prevent the public from assessing whether the transition away from public markets has led to better or worse management practices.

Recent Disruptions and Maintenance Oversight

The recent and severe disruption along the East-West Line, which involved extensive rail damage due to alleged maintenance failures, sharply contrasts with the purported benefits of privatization.

The lack of detailed financial reporting makes it difficult to verify if appropriate investments are being made in maintenance or if cost-cutting measures have led to reduced direct oversight and increased reliance on potentially less accountable subcontractors.

Discussion on Reddit recalled remarks made by SMRT Corporation Chairman Mr Seah Moon Ming in a June 2023 interview with The Straits Times.

He stated, “We never want to undermaintain because, in the past, it was an issue. But neither do we want to do overmaintenance.”

At that time, the 67-year-old emphasized the need for high performance while also considering costs. The Straits Times even boasted about the significant improvement in SMRT’s train services since his appointment.

While acknowledging that SMRT can always improve, Mr. Seah cautioned against excessive efforts to achieve ever-higher reliability scores, citing the risk of overspending public funds received through government grants.

The ST even boasted about the reliability of SMRT’s train services has improved significantly since his appointment.

While acknowledging that SMRT can always improve, Mr Seah cautioned against excessive efforts to achieve ever-higher reliability scores, citing the risk of overspending public funds received through government grants.

Mr Seah mentioned that SMRT is leveraging technology such as data analytics to optimize its maintenance regimen and better predict when components need replacement. He noted that SMRT’s rail lines have consistently achieved a mean kilometres travelled between failures (MKBF) of over one million train-kilometers—a recognized international measure of rail reliability.

Separately, SMRT Group Chief Executive Mr Ngien Hoon Ping, who was appointed in August 2022, stated that the one million MKBF benchmark is sufficient from a regulatory standpoint. The former LTA chief noted that raising this bar yields diminishing returns and could be prohibitively expensive.

“If 99.9 per cent of the time the train is going to work, commuters will take the train. Once you reach one million MKBF, it is about there already, ” Mr Ngien said.

So, what does Mr Seah’s position entail for the maintenance regime? When he says that SMRT does not want to do over-maintenance, how much more or less have they actually spent on maintaining the rail system?

We don’t really know, given that financial details have been omitted from the transport company’s annual report following its privatization.

A Call for Rebalanced Priorities

While the motive to shield SMRT from the volatility of public markets might have been well-intentioned, the resulting lack of transparency has significant repercussions. It impacts not just investor confidence but also public trust, as they can only speculate with the limited information available, especially when failures lead to substantial service disruptions like the ones we are seeing today.

For privatization to be genuinely effective, it must be paired with a commitment to transparency that reassures the public about the responsible management of their critical transport services.

As SMRT faces the most severe breakdown in Singapore’s transport history, it faces the imperative to disclose more, not less, about its maintenance regimes, staffing, and the deployment of resources to ensure the reliability and safety of its services.

The Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) recently withdrew corruption charges against former Singaporean transport minister S Iswaran, citing challenges in prosecution.

The AGC explained that proving corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) would be difficult, particularly as both Iswaran and property tycoon Ong Beng Seng (OBS) would likely avoid implicating themselves.

This explanation is perplexing, particularly when considering the legal framework provided under Section 8 of the PCA, which mirrors the presumption of guilt often applied in drug trafficking cases.

Under the PCA, once a public official accepts any form of gratification, corruption is presumed unless the official can prove otherwise.

This presumption shifts the burden of proof to the accused, much like in drug trafficking cases, where possession of a certain quantity of drugs triggers a presumption of trafficking, as detailed in Singapore’s Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA)​.

Former Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reaffirmed Singapore’s zero-tolerance approach to corruption in Parliament in August last year, saying, “We firmly believe that to maintain an honest political system and for the people to continue to trust the PAP, we must deal with issues transparently.”

“Therefore, when anyone, including Ministers or MPs, are involved in corruption or illegal behaviour, there is zero tolerance, and we will investigate fully. If the investigation finds that there was no wrongdoing or conflict of interest, the matter would be closed and those involved exonerated. If the investigation shows that there is misconduct, they would be dealt with the full force of the law.”

The PCA’s Section 8 is a cornerstone of this zero-tolerance policy. It ensures that public officials who receive any form of gratification must rebut the presumption of corruption, placing the burden of proof on them.

This provision is highlighted on the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) website under the heading “Ensuring Incorruptibility of the Public Service”, where it states: “The PCA also provides for a presumption where any gratification given or received by a person in the employment of the Government or of a public body is deemed corrupt.”

“The burden of proof to rebut the presumption lies with the person. In addition, public officers are expected to report any case where gratification is offered, accepted or demanded.” This demonstrates how integral Section 8 is to safeguarding the integrity of Singapore’s public service, underscoring its role as a key pillar in the country’s zero-tolerance approach to corruption.”

Yet, the AGC did not appear to place much, if any, emphasis on Section 8 when dealing with Iswaran’s case, despite this provision being a powerful legal tool designed to combat corruption.

This omission becomes more striking when experienced lawyers highlight that it is very difficult to rebut a presumption at law, especially in cases involving the PCA.

It is rare for the defense to successfully challenge such presumptions, making it puzzling why Section 8 was not given more importance in this prosecution.

Corruption vs. Drug Trafficking: Legal Parallels

Section 8 of the PCA operates in a similar fashion to drug trafficking cases under the MDA. In both instances, the law presumes guilt once certain thresholds are met—gratification in corruption cases, and possession in drug trafficking cases.

In Iswaran’s case, the AGC initially charged him under Section 6(a) of the PCA, which should have triggered the presumption of corruption under Section 8. However, the charges were later downgraded to Section 165 of the Penal Code, which deals with public officials accepting gifts without requiring proof of corrupt intent, and carries significantly lighter penalties.

The AGC’s reasoning for withdrawing the PCA charges—that both Iswaran and Ong might deny allegations of corruption—is juvenile and preposterous.

When the AGC decided to prosecute Iswaran, it must have been fully aware that both parties would deny the charges.

In fact, this denial is precisely why the PCA’s Section 8 exists: to shift the burden of proof onto the accused, making it their responsibility to disprove the presumption of corruption.

By claiming that a denial of guilt from both parties would complicate prosecution, the AGC’s justification becomes nonsensical. It is inconceivable that this was not anticipated at the start, making the decision to drop the charges difficult to justify.

To illustrate how the presumption of guilt is applied in drug trafficking cases, we can look at the 2018 Court of Appeal ruling in Zainal bin Hamad v Public Prosecutor.

The court noted that once possession of a certain quantity of drugs is established, the presumption of trafficking applies, shifting the burden to the accused to prove otherwise.

The judgment emphasized that “it was incumbent on [Zainal] to adduce evidence to raise a reasonable doubt” and that mere denials or weak explanations are insufficient to discharge this presumption​​.

Without credible evidence to counter the presumption, the court ruled that the accused was rightly convicted.

This demonstrates that once the presumption of guilt is triggered, the defense must provide substantial evidence to rebut it—something seldom successfully achieved.

The Decision to Downgrade to Section 165: A Simpler but Less Severe Offence

Downgrading the charges to Section 165 of the Penal Code, a provision used for the first time in Singapore’s 153-year legal history since the Penal Code was introduced in 1871, further complicates public understanding of this case.

Section 165 focuses on the act of a public servant accepting valuable items from individuals connected to their official duties without needing to prove corrupt intent.

Although the charges against Iswaran under this section are easier to prove than corruption under the PCA, the offence carries significantly lighter penalties. The law targets improper acceptance of gifts, but without the severity or focus on corrupt intent seen in the PCA.

This shift towards a lesser charge under Section 165 is seen as lenient, especially given the nature of the allegations.

While the AGC cited “litigation risks” in pursuing the PCA charges, the downgrade effectively softens the seriousness of the offence. Iswaran now faces a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment under Section 165, compared to the seven years possible under the PCA.

However, the prosecution has indicated that they will be seeking a sentence of 6-7 months for the four amended charges under Section 165, and one charge under Section 204A for obstruction of justice, which carries a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.

This raises further questions about whether public trust and justice are being adequately served. This approach contrasts sharply with Singapore’s zero-tolerance stance, especially considering the case of Wee Toon Boon, who was handed a six-month sentence simply for accepting roofing worth S$3,500.

In Iswaran’s case, the gifts allegedly received were far more extravagant—S$384,000 in gifts from Ong Beng Seng, and S$18,920.94 from David Lum.

The comparatively lenient sentence being sought, despite the substantial value of the gifts and the scope of the allegations, underscores a disconnect between the rhetoric of zero tolerance and the actions taken in this case.

This discrepancy is all the more striking when placed beside Wee’s case, where a much smaller gift led to a sentence of six months.

Public’s expectation on transparency and accountability

At its core, the public expects transparency and accountability, especially in cases involving senior public officials like Iswaran.

The decision to withdraw stronger corruption charges, particularly when Section 8 of the PCA could have been invoked, risks eroding public confidence in Singapore’s administration of justice.

When a senior public official is implicated in a corruption case, the public expects rigorous legal standards to apply, particularly given the strong anti-corruption stance that Singapore is known for.

The zero-tolerance approach to corruption in Singapore is founded on clear and consistent application of the law.

The AGC’s decision to downgrade corruption charges against S Iswaran, despite the legal mechanisms available under Section 8 of the PCA, contrasts starkly with how the law handles drug trafficking cases under the MDA.

Both legal frameworks share the goal of combating severe societal issues, and both rely on presumptions that shift the burden of proof to the accused when possession or gratification is established.

By downgrading the charges to a simpler offence under Section 165, the AGC risks undermining the consistency and integrity of Singapore’s legal system, raising questions about whether justice was truly served in this case.