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Town councils’ lift performance: Ownself check (score) ownself?

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After writing “Minister: 4 lift breakdowns per lift per year (score 2 out of 5) OK?” (Apr 10), I had a lingering naggy feeling that something wasn’t right .
All town councils’ lift performance “green”?
You see – the latest Town Council Management Report (TCMR) FY2015 had all the town councils scoring “green” for “lift performance”.

So many breakdowns, increase lifts’ S & CC?
How can this be – when there have been so many reports of frequent lift breakdowns, people getting injured or killed, resulting in the imposition of an additional 14 per cent of the Service and Conservancy Charges (S & CC) to the sinking fund (increase in S & CC)?
Are the rest as bad as Bishan-Toa Payoh?
Senior Minister of State, Mrs Josephine Teo said to the media that the performance of the lifts serving the three 40-storey Natura Loft blocks in Bishan-Toa Payoh GRC had 5.2 breakdowns per lift per year which fared worse than other estates in the GRC with similar high-speed lifts.
“We want to bring this number down to four breakdowns per lift per year, which is on par with the rest of the lifts in the GRC. I believe it can be done,” said Mrs Teo.
How can all the town councils have scored “green”, despite the above and the revelation now of the poor lift statistics for Bishan-Toa Payoh?

Something very wrong with the Town Council Management Report?
Do all these mean that there may be something very wrong with the TMCR and its scoring methodology?
Lift performance scoring methodology?
Well, let’s examine the lift performance scoring methodology.

Out of the total of 10 points – 4 points is for the frequency of lift breakdowns, 5 points for Average Lift ARD failure rate per month, and 1 point for the Percentage of lifts that break down frequently (equal to or more than 3 times a month). Making a maximum of 10 points for the sub-category of Lift Performance.
The chances of equal to or more than 0.1% of the total number of lifts breaking down equal to or more than 3 times a month may be quite small, such that the 1 point allocated may be quite easy to attain.
As to the “Average Lift ARD failure rate per month” – I googled and found the following:

“the largest lift company in the market is satisfied with the failure rate during the blackout.
“The reliability of this device is very high and chances of failure are very small,” said Phuah Cheng Kok, Executive Vice-President, Fujitec.
“Because it is an electro-mechanical device that’s dependent on a battery, there is still a small chance that this device can fail because of age or equipment failure.”
He added: “So looking at the number of calls that were received during the blackout, out of the whole of Singapore, there were only 20 cases, which makes it one in every 1,000 chance of failure. So it’s a very good statistic””.

Easy to score points?
So, does it mean that the chances of scoring high for this sub-category may be arguably, quite easy?
Even in the case of Bishan-Toa Payoh for having a score of 2 in its breakdown rate due to its annual 4 breakdowns per lift in the estate, the town council still receives a green score for having 8 points. (2 + 1 + 5)
Why so many points to the “easy scores” sub-categories?
If this is the case, why allocate so many points (5) to this “easy scoring” category, but only 4 points to lift breakdowns which arguably may be more important and significant but harder to score well?
Ownself Check (score) Ownself?
It does seem looking at the above – that the lift performance scoring methodology may arguably be – by design – intentional or otherwise – sure to score “green” one! (pardon my Singlish)

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Opinion

Singapore’s property market becoming a “casino”

Opinion: By rejecting underpriced bids like those for Jurong Lake District, Singapore is sending a clear message: speculative behavior from developers won’t be tolerated. This firm stance is crucial to ensuring corporate responsibility and protecting the long-term health of the economy.

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by Jasmine Lim

A Troubling Trend of Speculative Bids

Singapore has always been a beacon of responsible governance, and its recent decision to reject the underpriced bid for the Jurong Lake District (JLD) mega site exemplifies this commitment to long-term stability. At S$640 per square foot per plot ratio (psf ppr), the sole bid fell well below the anticipated range of S$900 to S$1,000 psf ppr (Business Times, Sep 13, 2024).

Yet, this incident is not unique and it raises a troubling question: Are some property developers acting like market gamblers rather than responsible businesses?

In the case of JLD, strategic partnership was formed among the five major players—CapitaLand Development, City Developments Ltd (CDL), Frasers Property, Mitsubishi Estate and Mitsui Fudosan (Asia), and was it a consequent outcome that resulted in limited competition that encouraged speculative underpricing?

Another recent example is the Media Circle site, where a Frasers Property-led consortium offered a bid of S$461 psf ppr—significantly below market expectations of S$650 to S$1,100 psf ppr (Business Times, Sep 19, 2024).

This bid wasn’t just low—it was almost recklessly so. When companies start to treat the market like a casino, underpricing in hopes of getting a “bargain,” it disrupts market dynamics and generates unnecessary uncertainty.

Market analysts have observed that speculative underbidding can depress overall market confidence, causing unnecessary volatility and eroding the value of strategic assets (Cohen & Han, 2020).

In fact, observations have consistently shown that speculative actions—whether through inflated bids or aggressive underpricing—create chaos in real estate markets.

Such behaviour leads to unpredictable price swings, erodes investor confidence, and has far-reaching effects on the wider economy.

So, when companies like Frasers Property, owned by Thailand’s TCC Group, engage in such repeated speculative actions of recent land bids, it raises serious concerns about their commitment to Singapore’s long-term economic health.

Will Developers Win This Game?

Governments around the world play a crucial role in shaping the property market, especially in times of uncertainty.

In fact, academic studies frequently highlight the importance of government oversight in preventing property bubbles and market crashes. When speculative behaviour takes hold, prices can spiral out of control—leading to a boom-and-bust cycle that benefits no one in the long run.

Singapore’s firm stance in the JLD tender echoes these findings and reinforces its long-held principles of responsible governance. After all, losses in land revenue, which could otherwise be invested in infrastructure improvements, translate into more welfare losses for the whole city (Today, Jan 15, 2020).

By rejecting the underpriced bid in the case of JLD, the government is ensuring that the property market remains stable and secure for both developers and residents.

A healthy property market doesn’t just benefit developers; it supports a healthy property sector, maintains investor confidence, and ultimately strengthens the fabric of society. The government’s move is a critical reminder that land, especially in land-scarce Singapore, should be developed with care and foresight.

Is there a Need for Corporate Responsibility?

It’s understandable that businesses are driven by profits, but there’s a fine line between profit-driven strategies and reckless market manipulation.

When large companies act in ways that destabilize the local property market, it becomes clear that corporate responsibility is being overlooked. They need to realize that their actions don’t just affect their bottom line—they affect the country’s economic stability and the property sector dynamism.

In a rapidly evolving global economy, the government’s role is more critical than ever. Without strong regulatory oversight, speculative behaviour could easily spiral out of control, leading to a housing crisis or economic downturn.

By setting firm boundaries, the Singapore government is leading by example, ensuring that our markets remain stable, resilient, and beneficial for all—residents, businesses, and investors alike.

Singapore Government’s “Over-Invention” An Unwelcomed Move?

Singapore’s approach to land and urban development is a model for the rest of the world. By staying true to its principles of responsible governance, the government has managed to build a property market that is resilient in the face of global economic uncertainty. This is a lesson other nations can learn from—how to balance growth with stability.

At the same time, the government’s decision to reject punting low land bid underscores a growing need for companies to act responsibly.

Academic research shows that unchecked speculative actions in real estate markets have historically led to devastating consequences—from property bubbles to economic crashes (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011).

We must not let Singapore fall into this trap. Instead, we must continue to hold both local and foreign companies accountable for their actions, ensuring that their pursuit of profits aligns with the broader interests of our nation.

Singapore’s strength lies in its ability to balance free-market efficiency with firm regulatory oversight, and will this series of decisions to reject low land bids prove that we are still on the right path for Singapore’s long-term prosperity?

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Opinion

CNA overlooks trend: Courts impose harsher sentences for establishment figures

Channel News Asia (CNA) recently published an article citing lawyers who framed the 12-month sentence for former Transport Minister S Iswaran as “unusual” for exceeding both prosecution and defence recommendations. However, CNA overlooked a broader trend of courts imposing harsher sentences in high-profile cases involving establishment figures.

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Karl Liew, S Iswaran, Gilbert Oh

Channel News Asia (CNA) recently published an article citing legal experts who framed the 12-month sentence handed to former Transport Minister S Iswaran as “unusual,” highlighting how rare it is for judges to impose sentences exceeding the recommendations of both the prosecution and defence.

While CNA accurately reflected the legal principle that judges have the discretion to apply their own sentencing decisions, the report downplays a clear emerging trend: harsher-than-requested sentences are becoming increasingly common in high-profile cases involving establishment figures.

In fact, two significant cases not mentioned by CNA—those of Gilbert Oh Hin Kwan and Karl Liew—further illustrate that this phenomenon is not an anomaly but part of a broader judicial pattern.

These rulings suggest that the courts are increasingly sending a strong message to public servants and influential figures, reinforcing the need for accountability and deterrence.

Justice Vincent Hoong, who presided over Iswaran’s case, underscored this point by noting the broader harm caused by breaches of trust in high-level public office.

The rationale behind the sentencing in Iswaran’s case was centred on general deterrence and the need to maintain public trust.

Justice Hoong pointed out that public servants, especially those in high office, must uphold integrity due to the potential damage their actions can cause to the reputation of public institutions. By imposing a sentence that exceeded the prosecution’s recommendation, the court sent a clear message that any breach of trust in public office will be met with firm consequences.

A Pattern Hidden in Plain Sight

CNA’s emphasis on the “unusual” nature of Iswaran’s sentence draws attention to the exceptional use of judicial discretion.

Mr Chooi Jing Yen, a lawyer quoted in the article, acknowledged that while it’s uncommon for judges to go beyond what the prosecution requests, they have the legal right to do so when they deem it necessary based on the facts of the case. He also noted that judges are not bound by the recommendations presented in court and can choose a higher sentence if they believe it better serves justice.

However, what CNA and its quoted lawyers failed to consider are two additional cases involving establishment figures: Gilbert Oh and Karl Liew.

Both received sentences that exceeded prosecution and defence recommendations, showing that while such judicial decisions may be rare in the general sense, they are increasingly common in cases where the prosecution’s recommendations seem mild in comparison to the alleged offences.

In Gilbert Oh’s case, the court imposed a one-week jail term despite both the prosecution and defence agreeing on a fine. Oh, a former Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), had misused his official position to illegally transport luxury items and lied about it.

District Judge Sharmila Sripathy-Shanaz noted that his role as a high-ranking public servant exacerbated the potential harm to public trust in the MFA, particularly since his actions could have disrupted the ministry’s internal investigations.

Similarly, Karl Liew, the son of former Changi Airport Group chairman Liew Mun Leong, received a custodial sentence of two weeks for providing false testimony during the infamous Parti Liyani case, despite both sides calling for a fine of S$5,000—essentially a slap on the wrist for an individual living in a mansion worth tens of millions.

Furthermore, just like Iswaran, Karl’s charge of s193 for intentionally giving false evidence was amended to a lesser charge of s182 during the hearing. No explanation was given for why the prosecution changed its charge against Karl.

District Judge Eugene Teo said he could not agree that Karl’s actions should be met with only a fine and pointed out that the prosecution’s submissions read like mitigation, which the Defence repeated wholesale in their own submissions.

These examples, not highlighted by CNA, clearly show a judicial pattern of imposing harsher sentences in cases where the prosecution has recommended relatively lenient penalties. The fact that these cases were not discussed in CNA’s article weakens its argument that such sentencing decisions are rare anomalies.

Justice Hoong’s Position in Iswaran’s Sentencing

It is also important to examine the stance taken by Justice Vincent Hoong in his sentencing of Iswaran.

Justice Hoong, in determining the appropriate punishment, carefully considered the positions presented by both the prosecution and the defence. However, he ultimately decided to deviate from their recommendations, citing the need for a more appropriate sentence given the circumstances of the case.

In his judgment, Justice Hoong referenced the High Court decision in Janardana Jayasankarr v Public Prosecutor [2016] 4 SLR 1288, which emphasised that sentencing is ultimately the responsibility of the court.

As noted in Janardana, while the prosecution and defence are expected to assist the court with their submissions, neither side’s recommendation should be viewed as binding.

Justice Hoong highlighted that “the Prosecution’s submissions on sentence is not, and should not be regarded as, the upper limit of the sentence that may be meted out.” Similarly, the defence’s proposal should not be seen as the minimum sentence.

Applying this principle to the case at hand, Justice Hoong determined that a sentence exceeding the proposals from both sides was necessary.

He argued that adopting either the prosecution’s or the defence’s recommendations would result in “a manifestly inadequate sentence.” By citing the gravity of the offence and its impact on public trust, he concluded that the 12-month jail term was more appropriate in ensuring justice was served.

What CNA’s Framing Misses

By presenting these harsher sentences as rare occurrences, CNA’s report misses an important point: when it comes to cases involving the establishment or public servants, the courts seem increasingly inclined to reject both the defence’s and prosecution’s recommendations in favour of harsher penalties. This approach may reflect a heightened awareness of public perception and a broader goal of protecting institutional integrity.

CNA’s article also fails to address why the prosecution in such cases tends to propose comparatively lenient sentences.

In Iswaran’s case, for instance, the prosecution sought a jail term of six to seven months, which, given the nature of the offence, some might argue was on the lower end of the sentencing spectrum.

The same can be said for the prosecution’s stance in the cases of Oh and Karl, where they initially recommended a fine.

This raises questions about whether the prosecution’s recommendations are, at times, shaped by the status of the accused, thereby creating an environment where the court feels compelled to impose a harsher sentence to correct for perceived leniency.

To be clear, this is not to allege prosecutorial bias or intent to shield establishment figures. However, the pattern of harsher sentences in these cases cannot be ignored, especially when viewed alongside the relatively modest proposals from both the defence and prosecution.

Growing Scrutiny on Sentencing Practices

The emergence of this trend also aligns with a broader public demand for transparency and fairness in sentencing, especially for individuals in positions of power.

Cases involving public officials are closely watched by the public, and any leniency shown in sentencing could be perceived as a double standard for those in high office compared to ordinary citizens. This is particularly important in a society like Singapore, where trust in public institutions is a cornerstone of governance.

By consistently imposing sentences beyond what is recommended, the courts appear to be responding to this societal demand for accountability. The message is clear: breaches of public trust, especially by those in the highest echelons, will not be tolerated.

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