ISD learned of Sar-El blog post in 2024, engagement with father and son followed year later, says Shanmugam

The Internal Security Department (ISD) became aware of a blog post linking to the Sar-El Volunteer Corps (Singapore) website as early as 2024 — a year before it formally engaged the individuals concerned — Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs K Shanmugam confirmed in Parliament on Tuesday.

The disclosure came in a written reply to oral questions filed by Workers' Party MP Fadli Fawzi (Aljunied GRC) and People's Action Party MP Yip Hon Weng (Yio Chu Kang SMC) on 7 April, which were not answered by the end of question time.

Fadli sought to establish how authorities had first learned of the blog post, whether they had advised its removal, and why the matter had not been made public sooner. Yip asked how the Ministry determines whether involvement with a foreign military-linked organisation crosses into prohibited participation in a foreign armed conflict, and where the line falls between permissible non-combat roles and conduct that is not acceptable.

Shanmugam confirmed that ISD had learned of the blog post — published by the individual identified in the MHA-MINDEF joint statement of 24 March 2026 as "A" — in 2024. The post contained a hyperlink to a personal website that redirected users to the Sar-El Volunteer Corps (Singapore) site.

At the time, A was based overseas pursuing his undergraduate studies. ISD subsequently engaged A, together with his father B, when A returned to Singapore in 2025. The Minister did not provide the specific date of that engagement. "For operational reasons, we do not discuss ISD's methodologies or sources," Shanmugam said, declining to elaborate on how ISD had come to identify the post.

ISD's investigations concluded that A and B had not been involved in any military activities with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during their two-week Sar-El stint in December 2016.

Nevertheless, Shanmugam said, ISD advised the pair that A's blog post was "inappropriate in the context of the conflict in Gaza." Following that engagement, A voluntarily took down the post. The post was subsequently reposted by others on social media, drawing renewed public attention in early March 2026 and prompting the Government's decision to provide a public account of the facts.

On the question of why the episode had not been made public at the time, Shanmugam explained that the Government routinely handles such matters through private engagement when individuals comply and there are no outstanding security concerns.

"Many such conversations take place with individuals who wish to go to Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, or other conflict zones. We do not make these conversations public, when the individuals comply, and there are no security issues," he said. The public disclosure in March 2026 came only after the matter was resurfaced publicly through social media.

Turning to Yip's question on where Singapore draws the line between permissible and prohibited involvement with foreign military-linked organisations, Shanmugam set out a case-by-case analytical framework.

He acknowledged that the boundary is not always defined by whether an entity is formally constituted as a military outfit. "When the conduct is linked with entities which are not strictly speaking military outfits, but the entities are nevertheless associated with foreign militaries, then whether that is objectionable depends on the facts of each case," he said. 

The relevant considerations, he explained, are what the entity does and the nature of its relationship with the foreign military.

Applying that framework to the 2016 Sar-El activities, Shanmugam confirmed that A and B had not been involved in any military activities and no action had been warranted. The pair undertook non-combat tasks including packing, sorting, painting, cleaning, washing and cooking.

However, the Minister drew a clear distinction between the position as it stood in 2016 and the standards applicable today. The Sar-El website now states that the organisation is "deeply committed to supporting the IDF" and that volunteers "work side-by-side with soldiers on IDF bases," with their service contributing directly to Israel's security — language that was not present on the site when A and B participated.

"Based on what is currently known about Sar-El and its activities today in support of the IDF, involvement in the group, as well as other organisations with similar objectives, would not be acceptable and Singaporeans should not volunteer with Sar-El," Shanmugam said.

He added that the Government would consider taking action under Singapore law, including under the Internal Security Act, against any person who proceeds to volunteer with Sar-El under current conditions, or who is otherwise found to be engaged in activities prejudicial to Singapore's national security and interests.

The Minister's reply built on the position he had set out at the 5 March sitting of Parliament, when he told the House that Singapore maintains zero tolerance for participation by its citizens in foreign armed conflicts regardless of which side they are on.

At that sitting, he had confirmed that a formal request for information had been submitted to the Israeli government following a Declassified UK report identifying two Singapore passport holders in IDF data, though no response had been received.

The 24 March joint statement by MHA and MINDEF stated that there is no information to suggest that A and B's 2016 Sar-El participation is related to the individuals identified in the Declassified UK report. Based on ISD's assessment that neither individual was involved in military activities with the IDF, MHA and MINDEF confirmed that A and B will not face legal action over their 2016 volunteering.